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Abstract 
Recent research has shown that University students with a history of self-reported mild 
head injury (MHI) are more willing to endorse moral transgressions associated with personal, 
relative to impersonal, dilemmas (Chiappetta & Good, 2008). However, the terms 'personal' and 
'impersonal' in these dilemmas have functionally confounded the 'intentionality' of the 
transgression with the 'personal impact' or 'outcome' of the transgression. In this study we used 
a modified version of these moral dilemmas to investigate decision-making and sympathetic 
nervous system responsivity. Forty-eight University students (24 with MHI, 24 with no-MHI) 
J 
read 24 scenarios depicting moral dilemmas varying as a function of 'intentionality' of the act 
(deliberate or unintentional) and its 'outcome' (physical harm, no physical harm, non-moral) and 
were required to rate their willingness to engage in the act. Physiological indices of arousal (e.g., 
heart rate - HR) were recorded throughout. Additionally, participants completed several 
neurocognitive tests. Results indicated significantly lowered HR activity at baseline, prior to, and 
during (but not after) making a decision for each type of dilemma for participants with MHI 
compared to their non-injured cohort. Further, they were more likely than their cohort to 
authorize personal injuries that were deliberately induced. MHI history was also associated with 
better performance on tasks of cognitive flexibility and attention; while students' complaints of 
postconcussive symptoms and their social problem solving abilities did not differ as a function of 
MHI history. The results provide subtle support for the hypothesis that both emotional and 
cognitive information guide moral decision making in ambiguous and emotionally distressing 
situations. Persons with even a MHI have diminished physiological arousal that may reflect 
disruption to the neural pathways of the VMPFC/OFC similar to those with more severe injuries. 
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Running head: AROUSAL AND MORAL DECISION MAKING 1 
The Influence of Arousal on Moral Decision making for Individuals with or Without Mild Head 
Injury 
Consider the following moral dilemma by Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley and 
(2001): 
Enemy soldiers have taken over your village. They have orders to kill all remaining 
civilians. You and some of your townspeople have sought refuge in the cellar of a 
large house. Outside you hear voices of soldiers who have come to search the house for 
valuables. Your baby begins to cry loudly. You cover his mouth to block the sound in 
..r 
order to prevent his crying from summoning the attention of the soldiers, who will kill 
you and your child and the others hiding in the cellar. To save yourself and the others 
you must smother your child to death. (p.22) 
Is it morally acceptable to smother a child in order to save yourself and others? In response 
to this question, most persons readily condemn the violation and in instances when they 
approved similar violations, their reaction time was assessed as slow (Greene et at, 2001). 
What accounted for these judgment patterns? Some researchers (e.g., Bechara, Damasio & 
Damasio, 2000; Greene et at, 2001; Haidt, 2001) suggested that in situations of uncertainty, a 
.. 
person's decisions and cognitions are guided by emotional reactions. If this is true, then what 
happens to a person who experiences reduced emotional feedback arising from diffuse brain 
injury? Would he or she be more inclined to decide to intentionally smother the baby in the 
above scenario? Specifically, would university students diagnosed with mild head injury (MHI) 
who are, reportedly, physiologically underaroused (e.g., Baker & Good, 2010; Chiappetta & 
Good, 2010; St. Cyr & Good, 2008; van Noordt & Good, 2010), exhibit differences in their 
decisions regarding moral violations that have been manipulated to reflect different levels of 
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intentionality (deliberate versus accidental). If there are confinned differences, what is the 
implication for these persons' behavior in the society? This study was designed to address these 
questions and specifically, explored the relationship between MHI and moral decision making 
and the impact of arousal on this relationship. 
A moral decision can be defined as a choice made by an agency that is based on a set of 
agreed on moral principles (Ciaramelli, Muccioli, Lodavas, & di Pellegrino, 2007). Many 
psychologists and philosophers, such as Hume, Kant, (as cited in Barth, 2006) and Piaget (1965), 
view it as the result of two processes: rational reasoning and intuitive emotions (e.g., Barth, 
J 
2006; Haidt, 2001; Kohlberg, 1981). Kant (1785, as cited in Barth, 2006) posited that moral 
decisions were the consequence of thoughtful and conscious reasoning. In line with this 
approach, early views of moral psychology, such as Kohlberg's theory of moral development 
(Kohlberg, 1981), emphasized the importance of the maturation of thinking style (i.e., the 
progression from an ~'ego-centric viewpoint" to a more "universal-law based" way of thinking) 
and moral principles in driving moral decision. 
Hume, on the other hand, (1758, as cited in Barth, 2006), contended that moral decisions 
developed from immediate aversive feelings based on observed or imagined violations to 
victims. In support of this view, more recent theories such as Haidt's (2001) 'SociaUntuitionist 
Model' emphasized that emotional reactions are elicited immediately when faced with a moral 
dilemma, which is then followed by slower, post-hoc reasoning for those judgments. In this 
regard, two studies have demonstrated that when individuals are confronted with dilemmas 
depicting some disgusting actions (e.g., incest or pushing a fat person to his death), they 
immediately decide that these actions are unacceptable but are unable to articulate any 
justifications for their stance. Haidt referred to this as moral 'dumb founding' (Haidt, 2001; 
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Hauser, Cushman, Young, Jin & Mikhail, 2007). Similarly, Haidt and Hersh (2001) found that 
intuitive reactions rather than perceptions about harm were better predictors of judgments of 
moral issues using examples such as homosexuality, masturbation and incest. 
The above fmdings suggest that emotional processes can influence moral decisions and as 
will be examined shortly, evidence from neuroimaging and clinical studies with individuals 
suffering from brain injury endorsed the significance of emotional brain areas such as the orbital 
frontal cortex (OFC) and the ventro-medial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) in guiding certain aspects 
of moral decision making (e.g., Anderson, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel & Damasio, 1999; 
J 
Ciaramelli et aI., 2007; Cushman, Young & Hauser, 2006; Eslinger & Damasio, 1985; Greene & 
Haidt, 2002; Greene et aI., 2001; Koenigs et aI., 2007). 
Head Injuries: Classification and epidemiology 
Traumatic brain injury (TBI) involves injuries to the brain due to sudden inertial forces to 
the head (Gaetz, 2004) and varies along a continuum of severity level and type due to the size of 
the force and location of brain lesions. At one end, a severe blow to the head that penetrates the 
skull can lead to death and coma, due to skull fractures, hemorrhage, edema, intracranial 
pressure, immense and irreparable tissue damage (Leetsma, 1988). This kind of injury is 
referred to as open-head injury (Kolb & Whishaw, 2003). At the other end ofthe continuum, 
there are moderate to milder brain injuries resulting from lesser forces, which mayor may not 
involve skull fractures. Within the milder range of injuries are complicated mild traumatic brain 
injuries (MTBI), which are characterized by a Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) of 13-15 and by 
intracranial abnormalities (e.g., hematoma, contusions) that are visible on CT scans (Iverson, 
2005). By contrast, uncomplicated MTBIs do not have any intracranial defects or skull fractures 
and are usually associated with better neurobehavioural outcomes compared to complicated 
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MTBls (Iverson, 2006). Taken together, these injuries are referred to as closed head injuries 
(CHI) (Kolb & Whishaw, 2003). They are mainly confined to the anterior regions (e.g., frontal 
and temporal regions) of the brain (Hofman et aI., 2001; Holbourn, 1943; Umile, Sandel, Alavi, 
Terry & Plotki, 2002), recently verified by diffuse tensor imaging (DTI) techniques (Hartikainen, 
2010; Noigi & Mukherjee, 2010). The continuum of severity of traumatic brain injury is shown 
in Figure 1. 
Very mildlh:an.si·ent Uncomplicated mUd Complicated mild 
-----------------At least 90% of aU iujulies-------------------
,J)'Ioderate 
-; 
Severe Caiastrop.hk 
Figure 1. Continuum of traumatic brain severity. Adapted from "Moderate and Severe 
Traumatic Brain Injury" by G.I. Iverson and R.T. Lange, 2011, in M.R. Schoenberg & J.G. 
Scott (Eds.), The little black book o/neuropsychology: A syndrome based approach. New 
York: Springer. 
It is estimated that 57 million persons worldwide have been hospitalized with one or more 
TBls (Langlois, Rutland-Brown & Wald, 2006) and, in Canada alone, there were 16,811 
hospitalizations in the period of 2003-2004 (Canadian Institute for Health Information (CIHI), 
2006). Approximately, 80-90% of these cases were mild (Cassidy et aI., 2004), while moderate 
and severe TBI represented 1 0% ~f these cases respectively (Kraus & Chu, 2005). MTBI has 
been described as an epidemic in industrialized countries due to high incidence rates -
500/1 00, 000 (Bazarian, et aI. 2005) and the rising health costs associated with its residual 
sequelae (Gue'rin, Kennepohl & McKerral, 2006) annually. However, the true scope ofMHI 
may be underestimated owing to the various definitions ofMHI used and the fact that only 75% 
of individuals with MHI seek medical assistance (Sosin, Sniezek & Thurman, 1996). 
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Additionally, at least 200,000 cases go unreported because they are seen in a doctor's office or in 
clinics (Finkelstein, Corso & Miller, 2006). 
TBI affects the entire lifespan but certain age-groups have been identified to be more 
vulnerable to these injuries. Individuals under the age of 19 years comprise the majority of 
victims ofTBI and in children there are two peak periods of occurrence: infancy and mid-to-Iate 
adolescence (CIHI, 2006). In this vein, McKinlay et aI. (2008) found that approximately 30% of 
the sample in their study had sustained a MHI before age 25. Good and colleagues (e.g., 
Dzyundzyak, & Good, 2010; St. Cyr & Good, 2007, van Noordt & Good, 2010) found that 30-
J 
56% of high functioning university students reported a history 6fMHI. Children and adults, aged 
o to four and 75 years and older, respectively, also have a high incidence rate ofTBI (Langlois et 
aI., 2006). 
TBI also occurs more frequently in certain groups. For instance, men are twice likely as 
women to obtain a TBI (Langlois et aI., 2006) and military personnel serving presently in 
Afghanistan and Iraq are at risk for sustaining a TBIIMHI (Elder, Mitsis, Albers & Cristian, 
2010). In addition, approximately 87% of individuals who are incarcerated have reported a 
history of head injury (Slaughter, Fann, & Ehde, 2003). 
The most common causes of TBIs are motor vehicle accidents, falls, assault, sports and 
recreational activities (Langlois et aI., 2006). However, cases resulting in hospitalization reveal 
specific demographic trends. For example, adults (20-39 years) are more vulnerable to 
sustaining a TBI from motor vehicle accidents (51 %) followed by assaults (20%) while youth 
and children, and adults over 60, are more likely to incur a TBI due to falls (40%, 76%, 
respectively), followed by motor vehicle accidents (39%, 17%, respectively). Sports and 
recreational activities account for 28% of youth injuries (CIHI, 2006). 
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Bio-mechanism of Head Injury 
The mechanisms of CHI involve a sudden acceleration/deceleration of the head with 
significant rotational movement and stretching of brain tissue in the skull (e.g., Levin, Benton, & 
Grossman, 1982; Ommaya & Gennarelli, 1974). This kind of impact typically culminates in 
"coup-contrecoup" injuries as initial trauma propels the brain against one side of the skull 
("coup"), and then causes it to rebound and collide with the opposite side of the skull 
("contrecoup") (Ommaya & Gennarelli, 1974). These movements of the brain render the orbital 
and the anterior temporal cortices especially vulnerable to contusions, minor hematomas and 
J 
edema, due to the forceful contact with the jagged internal geometry of the skull in these areas 
(Hofman et aI., 2001; Varney & Menefee, 1993; Mayer & Schwartz, 1993; Umile et aI., 2002). 
Furthermore, diffuse axonal injuries (DAI), a consistent feature of all TBI's, often occur due to 
the brain's exposure to rotational and acceleration/deceleration forces (Povlishock & Coburn, 
1989). These injuries are distributed throughout the gray/white matter interface extending from 
cortex to the brain stem areas, the splenium of the corpus callosum and along the long fibres of 
the internal capsule (Gentry, Godersky & Thompson, 1988; Orrison et aI., 1994) and can lead to 
impairments in axoplasmic transport and the accumulation of organelles (Povlishock & 
Christman, 1995). Notably, the extent ofaxonafinjuries is proportional to the severity of the 
impact such that increased amounts of force produce more axonal damage (Kushner, 1998). 
Ultimately, these fmdings of macroscopic damages suggest that there may be a neurogenic basis 
for the emotional and behavioural sequelae associated with even minor forms of brain injury. 
Pathophysiology of neurological disruption. 
The pathophysiology that facilitates TBI-related neuronal dysfunction can be grouped into 
two categories: primary and secondary injuries. As noted before, primary injuries occur from 
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initial impact and can lead to intracranial hemorrhage, contusion, shearing damages to brain 
tissue, and disruption to auto-regulation of cerebral blood flow. Conversely, secondary injuries 
arise from complex pathophysiologic processes such as hypotension and hypoxia (Kochanek, 
Clark & Jenkins, 2007). Giza and Hovda (2001) used animal models to investigate the secondary 
pathophysiology underlying MTBI and found a complex neurometabolic cascade which leads to 
diffuse cerebral swelling, neuronal, axonal and vascular damages. 
Giza and Hovda (2001, 2004) demonstrated that immediately after a concussion, there is an 
efflux of potassium ions (Na+), which triggers an indiscriminant release of glutamate, an 
J 
excitatory neurotransmitter, which binds to N-methyl-D-aspartate receptor (NMDA). This leads 
to further cellular depolarization that is accompanied by the continuous efflux of potassium and 
influx of calcium. This ionic imbalance activates the sodium-potassium pump (Na+ -K+) in an 
attempt to restore balance, which requires increasing amounts of adenosine triphosphate (ATP), 
thereby creating a rise in glucose metabolism. The resulting "hypermetabolism", coupled with 
reduced cerebral blood flow (an effect of the brain injury), produces a cellular energy 'crisis' as 
there is a discrepancy between glucose demand and supply. During this stage, postconcussive 
susceptibility is increased and the brain is incapable of dealing with a second injury. 
Immediately after this wave of activity, the brain enters a period of 'depressed' metabolism. 
During this period, continuing elevated levels of calcium may compromise the role of the 
mitochondria in glucose metabolism and thus exacerbate the energy crisis. Additionally, 
persistent increases in calcium may lead to cell death and impair neural transmission. 
Collectively, these series of events contribute to neuronal dysfunction, axonal and vascular 
injuries that render the brain susceptible to postconcussive impairments. 
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These results are consistent with findings of subtle impairments in memory that have been 
associated with temporal lobe abnormalities in MHI patients (Umile et aI., 2002). Moreover, they 
provide support for the model that proposes a deliberate relationship between damage to the 
brain and MHI-related cognitive and behavioral residual deficits. 
Lessons from individuals with severe TBI 
Neurological studies of individuals suffering from severe focal TBIs to the ventral-medial 
and orbital regions of the frontal lobe provide invaluable data for the affective neural basis of 
moral decision making. One of the classic cases providing evidence for the impaired moral 
J 
behaviours associated with brain injury dates back to 1848 when Phineas Gage, a 25 year old 
railroad worker, suffered from accidental damage to the anterior regions of the orbital frontal 
lobe cortex (OFC).This resulted in profound personality changes as he became irresponsible, 
impulsive, childish, and displayed a lack of concern for social conventions and the needs of 
others, hallmark signs of 'Acquired Sociopathy'(Blair and Cipolloti, 2000; Damasio, 1994). 
Contemporary individuals with "Gage-like" injuries also demonstrate the same 
neurobiological profile with slightly different moral outcomes based on one's age at injury 
(Anderson et aI., 1999; Blair & Cipolotti, 2000; Eslinger & Damasio, 1985). The case ofE.V.R, 
a happily married man who had tremendous success as an accountant, is one example. At the 
age of35, he was diagnosed with a brain tumor. While the operation to remove the tumor was 
successful, E.V.R sustained bilateral injury to his OFC. Within months of this operation, deficits 
were observed in his interpersonal relationships and decisions. E.V.R's tardiness and 
irresponsibility led to several job losses and two failed marriages. He also invested his money 
with a scam artist and as a result had to declare bankruptcy. However, his performance on 
'standardized' measures of moral reasoning and intelligence was unimpaired. 
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Similarly, Anderson et al. 's (1999) case study of two individuals demonstrated that 
prefrontal cortex (PFC) injuries extending to the fronto-polar regions acquired before 16 months 
of life produced impaired social behaviour such as lifelong lying, stealing, promiscuity, 
insensitivity to their own children, poorly regulated aggression, an inability to assess the social 
and emotional consequences of their decisions. They also displayed abnormal generation of skin-
conductance responses (a measure of autonomic arousal) which indicated further emotional 
deficits. Further, while they exhibited relatively average intellectual skills, they were severely 
impaired on moral reasoning and judgment tasks and were generally lacking in moral knowledge 
J 
illustrating the characteristics of 'Developmental Sociopathy'. -; . 
Several other studies (e.g., Ciaramelli et aI., 2007; Koenigs et aI., 2007) have demonstrated 
that adults with severe VMPFC lesions endorsed moral violations with utilitarian outcomes more 
frequently than non-injured controls. Koenigs et al. (2007), for example, examined how six 
individuals with VMPFC injuries made moral judgments using Greene et al.' s (2001) moral 
personal/impersonal test. In general, these individuals exhibited normal intellectual capacity and 
baseline moods but were impaired in the social emotions of embarrassment, guilt and empathy. 
Intriguingly, they gave more favorable ratings to high-conflict personal dilemmas that maximize 
aggregate well-being but are emotionally aversive (e.g., smothering a baby to save a group of 
people) relative to low-conflict personal (e.g., abandoning one's baby in order to avoid the 
burden of caring for it) and impersonal scenarios (e.g., keeping money found in a lost wallet). By 
contrast, those with no injury or other brain injuries were less likely to endorse these dilemmas. 
Further, non-injured participants took a longer time to endorse high-conflict scenarios when 
compared to low-conflict dilemmas. 
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Koenigs and colleagues (2007) interpreted these findings as support for the intuitive model 
of moral decision-making. The researchers argued that when non-injured persons are confronted 
with personal moral dilemmas, negative emotional responses are elicited and as consequence, 
they reject these violations. Conversely, individuals with VMPFC injuries are deficient in the 
social emotions necessary for moral decisions and, as a result, engage in utilitarian decision-
making. 
Consistent with these fmdings, Ciaramelli and colleagues (2007) found that non-injured 
participants were slower in their approval of 'personal' scenarios compared to less emotionally 
( 
arousing 'impersonal 'dilemmas. On the other hand, individuals with VMPFC injuries were more 
likely to approve of, and respond more quickly to, the actions in the personal scenarios while 
their responses to the non-moral and impersonal dilemmas were similar to non-injured controls. 
Thus, in summary, these data suggest that emotions, which are mediated by VMPFC/OFC 
regions of the brain, are critical influences in the generation of moral decisions. 
Somatic markers and decision-making 
In order to explain the neurobiological deficits observed in individuals with frontal lobe 
injuries, Damasio and colleagues (Damasio, 1996; Damasio, Grabowski, Frank, Galaurda, & 
Damasio, 1994) proposed that 'somatic markers'f and their evaluations influence decision-
making and social functioning. According to this model, the OFC is a repository of neural 
representations of appropriate behaviours for certain situations which have been learnt from past 
experience. The emotional valence of these representations is linked with a somatic marker 
which is an autonomic nervous system response that codes the value of potential behavioural 
outcomes. In situations of uncertainty, emotions in the form of "somatic markers" (i.e., a 
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person's 'gut feelings') guide decision-making by signaling the 'inappropriateness" of a 
contemplated action, leading to its rejection and the selection of more appropriate ones. 
Empirical evidence has provided support for the effect of somatic markers on appropriate 
social responsiveness and advantageous decision-making. Two studies that investigated the 
autonomic responses to physical stimuli (e.g., noise) and psychological stimuli (scenes of social 
disaster, mutilation and nudity) found diminished skin conductance responses (SCRs) in persons 
with acquired VMPFC injuries relative to non-injured controls (Tranel & Damasio, 1994; 
Koenigs et aI., 2007). 
J 
The use of the Iowa Gambling Task (a decision making:paradigm that pits uncertainty, 
rewards and consequences together) also provides evidence for the influence of 'somatic 
markers' on decision-making. This task involves the presentation of four decks of cards in which 
two decks yield high rewards but result in higher punishments while the other two offer low 
rewards and an overall net profit if chosen consistently. Individuals with VMPFC injuries failed 
to develop a preference for the low-paying decks and did not show SCRs prior to choosing from 
the high-paying decks when compared to their non-injured controls (Bechara et aI., 2000). Thus, 
it appears that OFCNMPFC injuries disrupt autonomic input or activity such that there is limited 
capacity to produce anticipatory etnotional responses to make advantageous decisions. 
In subsequent studies, Tranel, Bechara and Denburg (2002) found a similar pattern of 
risk-taking behaviours among frontal lobe patients. In particular, patients with right lateral OFC 
damage had the worst performance on the IGT. Results from Fellows and Farah's study (2005) 
contradicted this functional specificity and indicated that dorsolateral prefrontal damage was 
associated with poorer performance on the IGT task irrespective of the hemisphere that was 
involved. 
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The inconsistencies in the foregoing IGT results are indicative of the inherent problems 
experienced when trying to relate a specific region of the frontal lobe to risk-taking behaviour. 
Nevertheless, these fmdings clearly demonstrate that changes in peripheral, and somatic, activity 
influence emotional behaviour and feedback from this peripheral arousal guides response 
selection and, ultimately, decision making. 
Stimulus-reward learning and flexible behaviour 
An alternative model for impaired decision making as a result of frontal lobe injuries 
emphasizes the role of reverse stimulus-response learning in modulating decision-making (Rolls 
J 
Hornak, Wade, & McGrath, 1994). In general, a level of flexibility is required to make adaptive 
decisions when faced with contextual changes in one's environment. For instance, an insincere 
man may flatter a woman; however, after she recognizes his dishonourable intentions and 
predicts the negative outcome of being manipulated and hurt, she changes her behaviour by 
ending the relationship. By contrast, non-human primates and individuals suffering from OFC 
injuries are impaired at this flexibility as evidenced by their performance on stim,ulus-reward 
reversal tests. These tasks involve the presentation of two objects, one of which when chosen 
generates a reward. Later on, the contingencies are switched and the monkey or the individual 
must now learn to choose the correct object to oEtain the reward .. Monkeys and humans with 
OFC lesions tend to perseverate on the previously rewarded object and do not alter their 
behaviour in response to the non-rewarded object (e.g., Dias, Robbins, & Roberts, 1996; Jones & 
Mishkin, 1972; Roberts, 2006; Rolls et at, 1994). 
Blair and Cipolloti (2000) also endorsed similar ideas in their social response reversal 
model which contends that the social difficulties of a person with frontal lobe injury stem from 
an inability to modify his or her behaviour in response to changing social cues. Social response 
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reversal theory focuses on the ability to modify one's behavior based on the perception of social 
cues, in particular angry expressions. Noteworthy is the fact that the OFC is differentially 
activated when persons view angry faces, relative to sad faces (Blair, Morris, Frith, Perrett, & 
Dolan, 1999). However, persons who have sustained OFC injuries, demonstrate impairments at 
recognizing emotions such as anger, and disgust, and have problems in attributing anger, fear 
and embarrassment to story heroes (Blair & Cipolloti, 2000). This model seems plausible since 
angry expressions are crucial to the regulation of moral behavior as they signal that there is 
something wrong/disagreeable and a need for change in the current context (Potegal & 
J 
Stemmler, 2010). This flexibility in social behavior allows humans to survive in societies 
because they are able to adapt to their behaviors to the overarching social norms, and rules of the 
groups. 
Neural bases to decision making: The OFC 
The OFC, as described above, appears to playa critical role in social and everyday decision 
making. Hence, an understanding of the architecture and the responsibilities of this region is 
critical in the study of social and emotional consequences following MHI. 
The OFC is situated above the orbits in the ventral portions of the PFC (see Figure 2) and 
can be partitioned into five cytoaichitectonic suo-areas: the rostral polar area (Brodmann's area 
[BA]lO), anterior area (BAll), caudal area (BA13), medial area (BAI4) and lateral area (BA47 
and 12) (Wallis, 2007). There are four sulci that separate the entire surface into five gyri. There 
are also three parallel sulci that are located along the anterior-posterior axis: the olfactory sulcus, 
the medial orbital sulcus and the lateral orbital sulcus (Chiavaras & Petrides, 2000). The major 
regions and sulci of the OFC are shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Ventral view of the human brain depicting the major regions of the OFC and its 
main sulci. Olf = Olfactory sulcus, M= medial orbital sulcus, T= transverse orbital 
sulcus, L=lateral orbital sulcus. Adapted from "Comparative Architectonic Analysis of 
the Human and Macaque Frontal Cortex" (pp. 17-57) by M. Petrides, M., & D.N. 
Pandya, 1994, in F. Boller & J. Graftman, (Eds.), Handbook o/Neuropsychology, New 
York: Elsevier. 
Outline of connections. 
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The connections of the OFC exhibit two main features which make it suited for decision 
making. Firstly, it is well positioned to receive infonnation from the external environment 
because of its unique feature of having connections with all sensory modalities. Connectivity 
studies have shown that the gustatory and primary olfactory cortices including the anterior 
olfactory nucleus, olfactory tubercle and the pyrifonn cortex send inputs to the posterior regions 
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of the OFC (Carmichael, Clugnet, & Price, 1994).Visual infonnation is also transmitted to the 
caudal regions ofthe OFC via projections from higher order visual and polymodal association 
areas (Carmichael & Price, 1995). Similarly, auditory and somatosensory inputs are sent to this 
area from the secondary and tertiary auditory areas and the primary and secondary cortices, 
respectively (Romanski, Bates, & Goldman-Rakic, 1999). The OFC, in tum, sends projections 
out to these sensory and polymodal cortices (Cavada, Company, Tejedor, Cruz-Rizzolo, & 
Reinoso-Suarez, 2000). 
The responses ofthe OFC neurons to sensory stimuli typically reflect the emotional valence 
J 
(i.e., reward contingencies) of these stimuli and not their physical properties. In this regard, 
several human imaging studies have shown increased activity in the OFC in response to both 
rewarding and punishing stimuli presented in each of the sensory modalities of taste (O'Doherty, 
Rolls, Francis, McGlone, & Bowtell, 2001), odor (Rolls, O'Doherty, Kringelbach, & De Araujo, 
2003), audition (Frey, Kostopoulos & Petrides, 2000) and vision (O'Doherty et aI., 2003). 
Secondly, the OFC, in general, and the posterior regions, in particular, are reciprocally 
connected with the cortical limbic areas in the anterior cingulate and medial temporal cortex and 
with the sub-cortical limbic structures such as the amygdala, mid-line thalamic nuclei, cingulate 
gyrus, and the magnocellular sector of the mediodorsal thalamic. nucleus (Carmichael & Price, 
1995; Davidson, Putnam, & Lawson, 2000). Through its connections with the amygdala, the 
OFC can influence the central autonomic structures in the hypothalamus and brain stem areas, 
such as the periaqueductal gray area - a parasympathetic structure responsible for the emotional 
"fight" or "flight" responses (Ongur & Price, 2000). These latter structures, in tum, innervate 
spinal autonomic structures which activate the peripheral autonomic organs, such as the heart 
and lungs, in order for them to increase their responses during emotional arousal. 
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In view ofthe above, the OFC integrates physiological arousal, emotional and reward 
information needed for instrumental learning and stimulus-reinforcement associations (Mishkin, 
1964; Rolls, 2000), mechanisms underlying advantageous decision-making. In essence, the OFC 
modulates decision making by predicting the possible negative consequences and rewards 
associated with certain choices, thereby facilitating either 'approach' or 'withdrawal' behaviours. 
For example, a person will choose not to kill as a result of anticipating the negative emotional 
consequences that are associated with killing in the society (i.e., being ostracized or thrown in 
jail). In light ofthis, an injured OFC, for example as in E.Y.R, could arguably predispose him to 
J 
ignore the possible negative consequences oflosing his entire Savings or, similarly, individuals 
with early injuries to the PFC may fail to acquire moral values in line with their social context 
since the ability to associate the violation of these norms with negative emotional sanctions could 
be impaired. 
In summary, the OFC can be viewed as an "executive" area of the PFC as it is situated 
within a neural network that allows it to regulate the body's emotional mechanisms for 
advantageous decision..;making and social behaviour. 
Neural bases to moral cognition: Neuroimaging data. 
Recent brain imaging studies'with healthy subjects also provide insights into the neural 
underpinnings of moral reasoning and judgment. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) techniques, four major studies have consistently revealed activity in several brain areas 
including the VMPFC during a variety of moral appraisal tasks. 
One earlier, and influential, study in this area is Greene et a1. 's (200 I) distinction between 
'personal' and 'impersonal' judgments. In this study, several dilemmas were used to determine 
the conditions under which moral transgressions were judged to be acceptable. Personal 
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dilemmas were designed to elicit 'intuitive processing' and involved serious bodily harm to 
another person. Impersonal dilemmas included transgressions that involved no harm (e.g., 
stealing) or harm that resulted from unintentional means (e.g., a deflection of responsibility). 
The researchers found that reasoning about personal moral dilemmas (as compared to impersonal 
and non-moral dilemmas) stimulated greater activity in brain regions that are active during 
emotionally salient contexts, such as the medial frontal gyrus, posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), 
angular gyrus, bilateral and superior temporal sulcus. By contrast, impersonal dilemmas and 
non-moral dilemma generated greater activity in areas related to working memory, such as the 
J 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and bilateral parietal regions. Further, participants were 
slower in endorsing personal transgressions, but faster in disapproving them; whereas, reaction 
times were the same when approving or condemning impersonal and non-moral violations. 
Greene et al. (2001) interpreted these findings as supporting a combination of the rational 
and emotionalist models of moral judgment. They proposed that the medial prefrontal cortex 
modulates the strong emotional aversion (i.e., guilt and regret from causing deliberate harm to a 
victim) to harming an individual, and, thus drives moral disapproval. Against this background, 
fmdings indicating that participants were quick to disapprove personal moral violations are in 
accordance with the emotionalist account of moral judgment. On the other hand, fmdings of a 
longer reaction time indicate the subjects must overcome their negative emotional responses to 
engage in cost-benefit reasoning (a rationalist account), which is supported by the DLPFC. 
Since Greene et al. 's (2001) study, other studies have confirmed the activation of the medial 
frontal gyrus, frontopolar gyrus, PCC and posterior superior temporal sulcus (PSTS) during the 
evaluation of moral tasks. Moll, Oliveira-Souza, Bramati and Graftman (2002) used simple 
sentences that conveyed moral connotations (e.g., He shot the victim to death.) and feelings of 
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disgust (e.g., Pregnant women often throw up.). They found that the left medial OFC and left 
temporal pole, and STS were activated for the moral condition while the left lateral OFC, ventral 
visual cortex and the left amygdala were recruited in the non-moral/emotional conditions. 
While Moll and colleagues (2002) focused on the differential effects of moral versus non-
moral judgments, Heekeren et al. (2005) specifically examined the neural correlates associated 
with the impact of bodily harm on semantic and moral decision-making. Using simple sentences 
that conveyed, or did not convey, bodily harm, they found that moral decisions generated 
increased activity in the VMPC, the right PCC, the PSTS and the temporal poles compared to 
J 
semantic decisions. Subjects also responded faster to moral arid semantic stimuli depicting 
bodily harm than those devoid of harm. 
Finally, Berthoz, Grezes, Armony, Passingham, and Dolan (2006) investigated whether a 
person's judgment of the violation of social norms differed as a function of "who" is committing 
a transgression (i.e., 'Agent' - self versus other), as well as the "intentionality" of the violation 
committed (i.e., accidental or intentional). Participants were presented with several scenarios 
that were manipulated to depict the following transgressions: 'Self-Intentional' - the participant 
intentionally transgressed a social norm; 'Self-Accidental' - the participant accidentally 
transgressed a social norm; 'Other-Intentional':: another person, apart from the participant, 
intentionally transgressed a social norm; and 'Other-Accidental' - another person accidentally 
transgressed a social norm. They were then asked to evaluate the appropriateness of the agent's 
behaviours. 
Significant activations in the left dorsolateral PFC, superior frontal cortex, anterior cingulate 
gyrus, left amgydala, right cerebellum and, bilaterally, in the precuneus (the medial surface of 
the superior parietal lobe ) were found when the participant evaluated the scenarios depicting 
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intentional transgressions as compared to accidental ones. Further, increased activity was found 
in the left precuneus and right cerebellum when participants evaluated the violations committed 
by themselves as compared to those committed by others. Moreover, participants rated the 
accidental violations (regardless of the type of agency) more favorably than intentional violations 
(Berthoz et aI., 2006). 
The above fmdings suggest that a select group of neural structures overlap with the VMPFC 
regions responsible for moral judgment thereby leading to the concept of the 'moral brain'. The 
brain areas comprising the 'moral brain' are illustrated in Figure 3. 
( 
Figure 3. The 'Moral Brain' - Brain areas implicated in moral cognition by neuroimaging studies 
(Brodmann's areas in parenthesis): 1. Medial frontal gyrus (9/10), 2. posterior cingulated, 
precuneus, retrosplenial cortex (31/7), 3. Superior temporal sulcus, inferior parietal lobe (39), 4. 
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Orbitofrontal, ventromedial frontal cortex (l0/11), 5. Temporal pole (38), 6. Amygdale, 7. 
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (9/10/46) and 8. Parietal lobe (7/40). Adapted from "Physiologie 
und anatomie der emotionen," by Adolphs, R., 2003 - was in press at the time, In H.O. Karmath 
& P. Thier, (Eds.), Handbuch der Neuropsychologie (pp. 569-580). Heidleberg: Springer-Verlag 
as depicted in J. Greene & J. Haidt, 2002, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6,521. 
Definition and diagnosis of MHI 
While much of the literature has been focused on the social, cognitive and emotional 
consequences following moderate to severe brain injuries, these enduring effects in MHI, despite 
strongly debated in literature, have not been fully investigated. Little is known about the effects 
of having a history of mild head injury (MHI) on arousal levels and moral decision making, nor 
J 
its relationship to one's own intentional violation of social norms. Hence in this thesis it was 
investigated whether moral decision making is similarly affected with mild injuries to the 
head,and the complex relationships between MHI, arousal and moral decision making in 
university students was explored. The following literature will discuss the definition, post-injury 
symptoms, and the short-term and long-lasting deficits in functioning for persons with Mill in 
order to provide a theoretical background for this investigation. 
Although MHI can be considered a major health concern due to its high incidence rate, 
there is a lack of consensus surrounding its definition. For instance, the literature uses the term 
'mild head injury' interchangeably with 'mild biiin injury', 'mild traumatic brain injury 
(MTBI)" 'minor head injury', 'minor closed head injury' and 'concussion' (Mateer & D' Arcy, 
2000). However, MTBI is the term preferred by the neuropsychological community since it 
captures the idea of the brain being injured (Kay, Newman, Cavallo, Ezrachi, & Resnick, 1992). 
Against this background, one of the most frequently used definitions of MHI is the one proposed 
by the Mild Head Injury Interdisciplinary Special Interest Group of the American Congress of 
Rehabilitation Medicine (ACRM, 1993). According to this definition, an individual with a 
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MTBI is one who has had a traumatically induced physiological disruption of brain function as 
manifested by at least one of the following: 
(i) any period of loss of consciousness; (ii) any loss of memory for events 
immediately before or after the accident; (iii) any alteration in mental state at 
the time of the accident; and (iv) focal neurological deficit (s) that mayor may 
not be transient; but where the severity of the injury does not exceed the 
following: (i) loss of consciousness approximately 30 minutes or less; (ii) after 
30 minutes, an initial Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) of 13-15 upon hospital 
J 
admission and post-traumatic amnesia of not greater than 24 hours. 
(ACRM, 1993, p. 86) 
From this definition, it becomes clear that a loss of consciousness is not a prerequisite to be 
diagnosed with aMHI. . 
The GCS (Teasdale & Jennett, 1976) is the most widely used criterion to assess clinical 
research and practice (Iverson & Lange, 2003). It is designed to evaluate depth of coma 
following a TBI and consists ofthree subscales: eye-opening (ranging from 1-4), motor response 
(ranging from 1-6), and best verbal response (ranging from 1-4), with 3 being the lowest possible 
score and 15 the highest. In light 6fthis, an individual with a GCS score ranging from 13-15 can 
be diagnosed with a MHI. A GCS ranging from 3-8 can be classified as a severe head injury, 
while a score ranging 9-12 is indicative of a moderate injury. 
Notwithstanding, recent research has shown that there may be some limitations when 
applying GCS in the diagnosis ofMHI. For instance, a GSC score of 15 can indicate normal 
functioning following a MHI; while, on the other hand, this score may also indicate a transitory 
disruption in consciousness. Accordingly, this criterion in assessing MHI must be used with 
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caution as patients may experience cognitive dysfunction owing to their injuries despite not 
having GCS scores less than 15 (Giza & Hovda, 2001). 
Severity classification is also guided by the presence and length of postinjury loss of 
consciousness (LOC) and posttraumatic amnesia (PTA). PTA greater.than 7 days and LOC of no 
greater than 24 hours is indicative of a severe head injury (Fletcher et aI., 1995). Shorter 
durations (i.e., 30 minutes or less, between 30 minutes and 24 hours) ofLOC and PTA (i.e., 24 
hours or less, 24 hours to less than 7 days) are commonly related to milder or moderate head 
injuries (Levin et aI., 1982). 
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Finally, injury evaluation is enhanced by imaging techniques such as Computed 
Tomography (CT), Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) and Single-Photon Emission 
Tomography (SPECT). CT scans have been shown to detect small 'petechial hemorrhages that 
are associated with DAI in individuals with MTBI (Levi, Guilburd, Lemberger, Soustiel, & 
Feinsod, 1990). However, SPECT (Reba, 1993) and newer techniques such as DTI (Bigler, 
2008) have been shown to have higher sensitivity than CT in detecting structural abnormalities 
especially in milder injuries. 
Post-concussive Syndrome. 
After sustaining a MHI, many patients expenence a host of acute symptoms known as "post-
concussive syndrome" (PCS). These symptoms include physical ailments (e.g., nausea, vomiting, 
confusion, disorientation, unsteadiness, dizziness, headaches, sleep difficulties, insomnia and 
insensitivity to noise and light), affective and behavioural changes (e.g., anger, depression, 
irritability, and social difficulties) and cognitive complaints (e.g., problems with concentration, 
perception, executive functions, memory and problem solving) (ACRM, 1993; Giza & Hovda, 
2004; Sayegh, Sandford, &Carson, 2010). 
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Consistent with the interpretation that cognitive differences may persist following PCS, 
Smiths et aI. (2009) correlated brain area activation during different types of neuropsychological 
testing for an average of 31 days postinjury in persons who experienced minor head injury and 
demonstrated no significant findings on CT taken 24 hours after impact. They found that as the 
neuropsychological effort increased for a working memory task (2 n-back) and attention task 
(STROOP), there was a corresponding increase in brain area activations as a function of PCS 
symptom severity. 
The contributing factors to the development of these symptoms have long been debated in 
J 
the field of neuropsychology (e.g., Ericksen, 1882 as cited by Rutherford, 1989; Oppenheim, 
1889 as cited by Benton, 1989). For Ericksen (1882 as cited by Rutherford, 1989), these 
symptoms have a neurological basis while Oppenheim (1889 as cited by Benton, 1989) 
contended that they can be attributed to psychological factors. Various studies have provided 
support for psychological factors in the etiology of post-concussion symptoms (e.g. Iverson, 
2006). For example, McCauley, Boake, Levin, Contant and Song (2001) found that increased 
levels of depression at one month post-injury were a risk factor in developing PSC at three 
months; and Mooney, Speed and Sheppard (2005) found that a history of psychological insult 
such as depression and chronic pain was related-to outcome after MTBI. Finally, PCS in some 
individuals have been arguably linked to malingering and compensation-seeking (Lange, 
Iverson, Brooks, & Ashton Rennison, 2010). 
Conversely, many other studies (e.g., Bigler, 2008; Giza & Hovda, 2001, 2004; Umile et 
aI., 2002), as outlined above, have demonstrated a neurological basis for PCS. Together, these 
studies clearly indicate that neither psychological nor neurological factors alone have been 
accepted to fully explain the basis of the MTBI symptoms. Instead, Kay et aI. (1992), and more 
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recently Faux, Sheedy, Delaney, and Riopelle (2011), have proposed a multifactorial model 
which contends that a variety of neurological, psychological and environmental factors interact 
to drive the persistent symptoms ofPSC. 
Long and short-term sequelae of MID 
Several studies have indicated complete resolution ofPSC symptoms in the majority of 
persons following MHI (e.g., Faux et aI., 2011; Levin et aI., 1987; McCrea et aI., 2003; 
Rutherford, Merrett & McDonald, 1979). In one study of functional recovery of participants with 
MHI, Levin et a1. (1987) found complete recovery within three months. Similarly, Rutherford et 
J 
a1. (1979) found that approximately 95% of individuals with MHI had full resolution of post-
concussive syndrome at six months-one year post injury. 
More recently, McCrea et a1. (2003) used the Graded Symptoms Checklist (Lovell and 
Collins, 1998), Balance Error Scoring System (McCrea, Randolph, & Kelly, 2000) and the 
Standardized Assessment of Concussion (Guskiewicz, Ross, & Marshall, 2001) to investigate 
functional outcome after concussion and found that athletes returned to pre-injury function 
within seven days. Notwithstanding, researchers have argued that this "good' recovery may very 
well represent a behavioural adjustment instead of the actual regaining of previous functioning 
abilities (Segalowitz, Bernstein &'Lawson, 200i). 
Cognitive sequelae. 
Despite the documented instances of short-term recovery, growing evidence indicates that a 
sub-group of individuals following MHI continue to show deficits in cognitive functions 
involving working memory (Baker & Good, 2009), processing speed (e.g., Bernstein, 2002), and 
divided and selective attention (e.g., Bohnen, Jolles, & Twijnstra, 1992). Broglio, Macciocchi 
and Farrera (2007) found that 35% of the college athletes who experienced a sports-related 
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concussion (acquired through football, soccer, cheerleading, equestrian sports) continued to 
demonstrate neurocognitive impairment after they no longer reported experiencing concussion-
related symptoms. 
In one study that investigated the cognitive residua following MHI, Baker and Good (2009) 
administered a series of neuropsychological tests to evaluate cognitive impairments in university 
students with a history (two years) of self-reported head MHI. History ofMHI was defined as a 
yes/no response to the question "Have you ever hit your head against a surface or object which 
altered your consciousness (e.g. loss of consciousness, vomiting, dizziness)?" Results indicated 
J 
that students with MHI performed more poorly on neuropsychological measures of working 
memory (Trail Making Test, Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2002; Digit Symbol-Copy task, 
Wechsler, 1997), and attention (Stroop Colour-Word Interference subtest, Delis et aI., 2002) than 
non-injured students. 
Consistent with these results, Bohnen et aI. (1992) investigated the cognitive performance 
of individuals with persistent PSC (i.e., six years after injury) by administering a divided 
attention task and the Stroop Colour-Word Interference test (often referred to as Stroop). 
Diagnostic criteria for MHI comprised the following: PTA less than 60 minutes, LOC less than 
15 minutes, a GCS score of 15 and the absence or any serious traumatic physical injury, while 
PSC was assessed using a checklist. Findings revealed that symptomatic persons performed 
poorly on the Stroop task, especially on the more challenging sub-test, compared to non-injured 
controls and symptom-free individuals. Further, symptomatic persons were significantly slower 
in their reaction time on the divided attention tasks relative to the other two groups. 
Another study conducted by Bernstein (2002) found reduced information processing 
among university students with a history of self-reported head injury. Using event related 
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potentials (ERPs) during the processing of two complex auditory tasks and several auditory 
discrimination tasks, it was revealed that MHI students had lower discrimination (d') on the 
former tasks and reduced P300 evoked potential amplitudes on the latter relative to their non-
injured counterparts. 
Emotional sequelae. 
Empirical evidence has also accumulated indicating reduced physiological arousal among 
university students with MHI (e.g., Jung & Good, 2007; St. Cyr & Good, 2007, 2008). In their 
study, Jung and Good (2007) investigated the influence of psychological stress on cognitive 
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performance in university students with a history of self-reported MHI. MHI diagnosis was 
consistent with the deftnition proposed by Kay et a1. (1993). Findings indicated lower heart rate 
(HR) among MHI students compared to non-injured controls during a psychological stressor 
(e.g., presenting on several highly stress-provoking topics while being taped by camera). 
Additionally, MHI students demonstrated lower levels of self-reported anxiety as measured by 
the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-2 (STAXI-2) (Spielberger, 1996). Further, MHI students with 
increased stress performed better on the Stroop task compared to their non-injured counterparts. 
St. Cyr and Good (2008) generated similar results after examining the interacting effects 
of stress-anxiety and memory performance in uiiiversity students with a history of MHI. Again, 
MHI criteria were similar to Kay et a1.'s (1993) deftnition. Results indicated that MHI students 
had lower levels of self-reported state anxiety (Spielberger, 1996) despite reporting a higher 
number (and intensity) of stressful life events compared to non-injured controls. Additionally, 
MHI students who experienced higher levels of stress performed better on verbal memory tasks 
(Logical Memory I and II of the Wechsler Memory Scale-III (WMS-III) - Wechsler, 1997). 
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Conversely, students without a history ofMHI performed poorer on these tasks when 
experiencing higher levels of self-reported anxiety. 
Deficits in emotional recognition have also been noted in participants following MHI 
similar to those observed in individuals with more severe injuries (e.g., Blair & Cipolotti, 2000). 
For example, van Noordt and Good (2010) reported that university students with a prior history 
of MHI were significantly less able to recognize negative emotional facial expressions, 
particularly those involving anger, than participants without previous head injury. 
These findings suggest that individuals with a history of MHI present with reduced arousal 
J 
levels and will be less sensitive to the emotional significance of stimuli. Counterintuitive, 
increased arousal seems to confer cognitive benefits with respect memory for university students 
with a history of self-report MHI. 
Moral sequelae. 
Finally, it has been demonstrated that university students with a history ofMHI make 
different moral decisions compared to non-injured controls. Using the Social Problem Solving 
Inventory-Revised (D'Zurilla, Nezu, & Maydeu-Olivares, 2002) and Greene's et al. (2001) 
personal and impersonal test, Chiappetta and Good (2010) found that MHI participants viewed 
themselves as equally competent at social problem solving but were more likely than non-injured 
controls to endorse personal violations and were faster doing so. Moreover, MHI participants did 
not differ in their response times to personal and impersonal dilemmas. These findings are 
consistent with the interpretation that individuals with mild trauma may be less likely to use or 
have available emotional/physiological cues, which are modulated by the OFCNMPFC, to 
inhibit less conventional choices. As discussed above, the OFCNMPFC regions are susceptible 
to injury in MHI and can lead to disruption in neural communication with the hypothalamus, 
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amygdala, and brain stem regions such as the periaqeductal grey - areas (Carmichael & Price, 
1995; Davidson, Putnam & Lawson, 2000). Consequently, individuals with MHI may be 
physiologically underaroused which, in turn, may predispose them to make choices that have 
immediate and utilitarian benefits. 
Rationale for the Study 
As noted before, recent work by Chiappetta and Good (2010) using Greene et aI.'s (2001) 
moral dilemmas has revealed the willingness of individuals with MHI to engage in personal 
violations that lead to utilitarian outcomes. However, close scrutiny of these materials has 
,I 
revealed some challenges in terms of the type of harm caused by each transgression within the 
impersonal and personal dilemmas. More specifically, impersonal dilemmas included both 
bodily harm and non-physical harm outcomes committed in an unintentional manner and 
personal dilemmas included both bodily harm committed unintentionally and deliberately, as 
well as non-physical harm outcomes. These variations are meaningful as they were found to be 
correlated with physiological arousal in post hoc analyses, thereby, providing evidence for the 
influence of somatic feedback on decision-making. 
In short, past research did not control well for the type of harmful outcome that a moral 
transgression will produce and, thus, it is unclear how the neural and behavioral correlates of 
moral decision-making are modulated. Hence, the present research was designed to replicate and 
extend Chiappetta and Good's (2010) work by investigating moral decisions as a function of 
MHI using modifications of Greene's stimuli (Greene et aI., 2001; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, 
Darley, & Cohen, 2004). The stimuli were adapted and, as needed, restructured to depict three 
types of transgression outcomes: physical harm, non-physical harm and no-harm. 
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In addition, given the importance of 'intention' on moral and social decision making (e.g., 
Berthoz et aI., 2006), the scenarios were written in such a way as to describe two different levels 
ofthe agent's intention: acts will be produced in a deliberate or accidental manner. Also 
examined in this study was whether individual differences in cognitive skills, physiological 
responsivity, and social reasoning are related to the kinds of decisions made by participants with 
and without a history of MHI. 
In order to investigate this problem, we chose to assess a group of competent individuals 
with a history ofMHI (university students) since they have been found to exhibit subtle 
J 
emotional, physiological and behavioural deficits despite their -adequate intellectual capacity. In 
this manner, there is less concern that the decisions made by these students are a function of 
being uninformed or less than optimal problem solving abilities. In addition, there is evidence 
university population is an ideal group to study because there is an expectation that there will be 
substantial representation of subjects having sustained a previous MHI (Yeates & Taylor, 2005; 
Segalowitz & Lawson, 1995). The investigation of this particular individual difference could 
shed light on the question of whether individuals with mild head trauma exhibit the same 
neurobiological profile as those with moderate to severe injury to the OFCNMPFC areas. 
We also collected physiological data that included eletrodermal activity, EDA, HR and 
respiration while participants respond to a modified version of Greene et aI. ' s (2001) moral 
dilemmas. This was due to the tenets of somatic marker hypothesis, which proposed that 
physiological responses influence decision making in situations of uncertainty (Damasio, 1996; 
Damasio, Grabowski, Frank, Galaurda, & Damasio, 1994). The rationale for using each of these 
measures is described hereunder. 
Electrodermal Activity (EDA). 
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The changes in the electrical conductance of the skin during the processing of affective and 
physical stimuli are referred to as EDA. EDA is assessed by placing a pair of electrodes on the 
fingers of one hand and applying an imperceptible current across the electrodes. EDA variation 
reflects states of arousal and alertness (Scarpa & Raine, 2003) and is determined from the 
sympathetic nervous system innervations (primarily cholinergic fibres) of eccrine sweat glands 
(Dawson, Schell, & Filion, 2007). As such, EDA provides a non-invasive index of sympathetic 
arousal that taps states of arousal, attention and emotional processing. Moreover, EDA has an 
advantage over other indices of autonomic nervous system such as HR because it is under 
J 
precise control of the sympathetic branch of the autonomic nerVous system (Dawson et aI., 
2007). 
Heart Rate (HR). 
HR is another psychophysiological measure of autonomic responses to novel or affective 
stimuli. Changes in heart rate reflect sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous system activity 
and can be evaluated tonically (i.e., beats per minute at rest) and phasically (i.e., alteration in 
response to an event) (Scarpa &Raine, 2003). A major benefit in using HR measures is that the 
deliberation of change (acceleration or deceleration responses to stimuli) can be interpreted in 
terms of a balance between sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous activity (Skwerer et aI., 
2009). HR acceleration is related to the processing of aversive events (i.e., an index of defensive 
reactions) or to the anticipation of a stimuli, that necessitates cognitive elaboration (Lacey, 1967 
as cited in Skwerer et aI., 2009) while HR deceleration is associated with attentional shifts (i.e., 
orienting or alerting responses) (Binder, Barry, & Kaiser, 2005 as cited in Skwerer et aI., 2009). 
Respiration. 
Running head: AROUSAL AND MORAL DECISION MAKING 31 
Respiratory activity is detennined both from central nervous system activity and 
homeostatic mechanisms. In this regard, changes in the breathing patterns (reflective of 
alternations of oxygen and carbon dioxide homeostasis and sympathetic activity) have been used 
in studies of emotion and affective processes. For example, altered respiratory activity (e.g., 
depth of inspiration breathing and breathing rate) vary across different emotive states such as 
anxiety, laugher and anger (Timmons & Ley, 1994). In addition, reduced respiratory rates have 
been related to attenuated EDA or cardiovascular activity in stressful situations (Cappo & 
Holmes, 1984; Grossman, 1983). Thus, respiratory activity will be used as a complement 
J 
measure of physiological arousal to EDA and HR during the evaluation of the moral dilemmas. 
Hypotheses 
In the current study, it was expected that individuals with a history ofMHI will generate 
lower levels of arousal as indicated by self-report ratings and physiological indices such as EDA, 
HR and respiration compared to those who do not report experiencing a previous MHI. 
Consequently, MHI individuals will rely more on the cognitive appraisal of moral dilemmas and 
less on physiological feedback and, therefore, will engage in less conventional decisions than 
their non-injured cohort. In general, the following questions will be examined. 
1. Is there a relationship between arousal levels and a history of MHI? Due to the 
role of the orbitofrontal and ventromedial prefrontal cortices in regulating physiological 
and emotional feedback and their particular vulnerability in traumatic brain injuries 
(Mayer & Schwartz, 1993; Ongur & Price, 2000; Umile et aI., 2002), it was expected 
that participants who report a history of MIll would be more likely to demonstrate 
reduced levels of arousal on physiological and self-report measures during baseline 
and during decision making performance compared to non-MIll participants. 
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2. Will participants who report a history of MHI differ from non-MHI participants 
in their decisions and response time on moral dilemmas? Individuals with both 
severe and mild frontal lobe injuries differ from non-injured controls by engaging in 
utilitarian decisions due to the role ofVMPFC/OFC in failing to modulate the 
emotional responses which can bias individuals away from these less conventional 
choices (Mishkin, 1964; Rolls, 2000). In addition, previous studies have indicated that 
the evaluation of moral violations is dependent on whether the violation was committed 
unintentionally or deliberately despite incurring the same physical consequences (Baird 
J 
& Astington, 2004). In keeping with this, a three-way interaction (head injury status x 
dilemma outcome x intentionality) was predicted such that persons with MHI (who 
have less physiological and emotional feedback) would be less aversive to conflicts in 
moral dilemmas than their non-MHI counterpart. More specifically, it is hypothesized 
that participants with a history of MHI would rate themselves as more likely to report 
that they would commit moral violations independent of the intentionality (deliberate or 
unintentional) and outcome (physical harm, non-physical harm, no harm) of the 
dilemma, and would do so more quickly, than their non-MHI counterparts. 
3. Will sympathetic arousal mediate the relationship between MHI and moral 
decision-making? As noted, empirical evidence has indicated that individuals with 
focal frontal lobe injuries are less emotionally responsive and, more specifically, lack 
the ability to generate and use 'somatic markers' to guide decision making on the IGT 
task (Bechara et aI., 2000; Eslinger & Damasio, 1985). It is possible that incurring a 
MHI may impede the ability to process and use 'somatic markers', which in turn, 
results in impaired decision making. Consistent with this, it was expected that a history 
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of MIll would be associated with/result in reduced arousal levels and it is this lowered 
physiological feedback that influences one's decision making. Therefore, MIll status 
would be indirectly related to decision making as a function of physiological arousal. 
This model is illustrated in figure below. 
Figure 4. Mediation Model Depicting the Relationship Among MHI Status, Arousal 
Levels and Moral Decision making 
c' 
Head Injury Status ------------------.1 Decision making 
a~ ' /, 
1 Arousal Levell 
4. Will a history of MHI be related to poorer executive functioning and outcomes of 
decision making? Participants who have sustained injury to frontal cortices have been 
shown to variably perform less well than their age-matched cohorts on tests of 
executive functioning (particularly tests of working memory, attention and cognitive 
flexibility) (Baker & Good, 2009) ). Since limits on these executive functioning skills 
can effect one's ability tt> anticipate, c(1nsider multiple yariables/scenarios/outcomes 
simultaneously, or appreciate alternative perspectives simultaneously, they can also 
place limits on one's ability to evaluate (Rolls, 2000; Rolls et aI., 2003; Stuss et aI., 
200;) and judge complex problems and can, therefore, influence their performance on 
decisions made to moral dilemmas. In light of this, it was expected that MIll 
participants would be more likely to perform poorly on test of executive functioning 
that tap cognitive flexibility, working memory and attention when compared to non-
MIll participants, and may be reflected in differences in moral decision making. 
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5. Past fmdings have shown that individuals with a history of MHI report experiencing 
PCS more often, with increased intensity and for longer durations (Gouvier et a!., 1992; 
Baker & Good, 2009) as compared to non-injured controls. In line with this, it was 
expected that this finding would be replicated. 
Method 
Participants 
J 
Forty-eight students enrolled at Brock University were included in our study (24 MHI, 24 
No MHI). Since MHI status was unknown until participation in the research was complete, 88 
students were originally tested in order to obtain 24 students who reported a previous head 
injury. Recruitment for participation was carried out in accordance with the Research Ethics 
Board (REB) procedures: through posters placed throughout the university, Brock University 
Psychology Department's SONA system, and from invitations extended to several classes. In 
order to prevent the influence of head injury identification (known as "diagnosis threat") on 
decision-making, there were no selection criteria for this individual difference (Suhr & Gunstad, 
2005). 
Students were eligible for the MHI group if they had answered in the affirmative to the 
question "Have you ever hit your head against a surface or object which altered your 
consciousness (e.g. loss of consciousness, vomiting, dizziness etc)?" (Kay et aI., 1993). Of the 
original sample, 29 (33%) participants reported incurring a MHI. However, 1 participant was 
excluded from the analysis as her injuries were classified as severe (due to a stroke) while an 
additional 4 participants were dropped as they had incomplete or corrupted data for the relevant 
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variables. Twenty-four non-MHI participants (40.7%) were selected on the following basis: (a) 
order of testing (such that students tested first were included if they fit the following additional 
criteria); (b) having a complete/noncorrupt data file for each of the test variables (this was a 
particular concern for physiological measures); and (c) matched to MHI on age and education, as 
well as assignment to one of the four counterbalance orders (ideally, N=6 per order). Note, 
overall there were no significant differences between the 48 participants (24 MHI, 24 No MHI) 
and the 40 non-participants (5 MHI, 35 No MHI) for educational level, i (d! = 2, N = 88) = 
.712,p = .70, and age, F (1,86) = 1.36,p =.245. However, the groups differed by gender, i (d! 
J 
= 1, N = 88) = 3.62,p = .05, such that there were more males thim females in the participant 
group. 
The final sample for the study consisted of forty-eight (54.5% of the total group identified) 
participants (29 females, 19 males, Mage = 20.63 years, SD = 2.98, range: 18 - 29 years) and 
included first (27.1 %) and upper year students (i.e., second year, 12.5%; third year, 20.8%) who 
majored predominantly in Psychology (31.3%) and Kinesiology (14.6%). Participants included 
in the analysis were randomly assigned to one of the four counterbalanced moral dilemma 
conditions: Order 1 (n = 14), Order 2 (n = 12), Order 3 (n =10) and Order 4 (n = 12) (refer to 
Appendix B: Table 1). No differences were observed across these orders with respect to sex, 
level of education, and age: i (d!= 3, N = 48) = 5.45,p = .141; i (d!= 6,N= 48) = 6.72,p = 
.348; andF (3,28.82) = .313,p = .816\ respectively. As shown in Table 2, the MHI and No 
MHI participants did not differ on a variety of demographic and medical history variables. The 
majority of the participants were right-handed (89.6%; MHI, n = 20, No MHI, n = 23). 
Of the final sample, 24 (50%) (Mage = 21.21 years, SD = 3.00 years, age range: 18-28 years, 
13 females, 11 males) students reported incurring a MHI. The mean age at time of head trauma 
1 Brown-Forsythe test 
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was 14.78 years (SD = 4.12, range: 3-20 years) and average length of time since this head injury 
was 5. 87 years (SD = 4. 20 years, range: 8 months - 16 years). 
There were 24 (50 %) non-injured controls who were on average, 20.04 years old (SD = 
2.89 years), with an age range of 18 to 29 years. Ofthe non-injured participants, 16 were 
females and 8 were males. Informed consent was obtained from the participants and they were 
given research participation credit for their efforts. 
Table 2 
Summary Statistics for Demographic and Medical Characteristics for Participants with MHI and 
NoMHI 
Gender 
Female 
Male 
Education 
High school graduate 
College graduate 
15t year university 
2nd year university 
3rd year university 
MHI 
(n = 24) 
n % 
13 54.2 
11 45.8 
6 25.0 
2 8.3 
5 20.8 
2 
8 
8.3 
33.3 
NoMHI 
(n = 24) 
n % 
16 66.7 
8 33.3 
6 25.0 
1 4.2 
8 33.3 
4 
2 
t (dj);p 
7.84 (1); .376 
7.84 (1); .376 
16.7 
8.3 
Running head: AROUSAL AND MORAL DECISION MAKING 37 
4th year university 1 4.2 1 4.2 
Handedness 2.54 (2); .280 
Right 20 83.3 23 95.8 
Left 2 8.3 1 4.2 
Both 2 8.3 0 0.0 
History of hospitalization complications 
Surgery 6 25.0 8 33.3 0.54 (1); .464 
Illness 12 50.0 5 20.8 4.06 (1); .044* 
(' 
Fractures 10 41.7 2 8.3 7.11 (1); .008** 
Neurological 1 4.2 1 4.2 0.97 (1); .322 
Diagnosis of: 
Neurological 1 4.2 1 4.2 2.00 (2); .368 
Psychiatric 2 8.3 1 4.2 0.35 (1); .551 
Medication for psychiatric or neurological 2 8.3 0 0.0 2.08 (1); .149 
Age (years) 1.87 (1, 46); .178 
M(SD) 21.21 (3.00) 20.04 (2.89) 
*p < .05; *p < .01 
Materials and Stimuli 
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Individual differences questionnaires. 
Individual differences were evaluated in tenns of health, social problem solving styles 
(using the Social Problem Solving Inventory-Revised - SPSI-R; D'Zurilla et aI., 2002), and 
arousal state. 
Health status: Demographic questionnaire. 
Health status was assessed in tenns of the cognitive, physical and emotional concerns 
related to head injury using the Brock Neuropsychology Cognitive Research Laboratory 
Demographic Questionnaire (BNCRLDQ, 2009; refer to Appendix A3). Of particular interest 
J 
was participants' self-reported status of previous traumatic head injury as determined by 
answering the following question: "Have you ever hit your head against a surface or object 
which altered your consciousness (e.g. loss of consciousness, vomiting, dizziness)?" As well, 
infonnation regarding the history of a MHI, severity of the injury, age at injury and time post-
injury were obtained. Participant's demographic characteristics such as sex, age, education, 
handedness, and history of drug use were also collected. 
Health status: Post-Concussive Symptoms Checklist (PCSC). 
Post-concussion syndrome was assessed using the Post-Concussive Symptoms Checklist 
(PCSC) (Gouvier, Cubic, Jones, grantley & Cutiip, 1992) (see Appendix A4). This measure 
consisted of nine symptoms that are usually associated with post-concussion syndrome: 
headaches; dizziness; irritability; memory problems; difficulty concentrating; visual disturbance; 
aggravation by noise; judgment problems; and anxiety. Subjects were asked to rate the 
frequency, intensity and duration of each symptom on a 5-Point Likert type scale ranging from 1 
(not at all) to 5 (all the time). Each participant received four types of scores: frequency total, 
duration total, intensity total and a general total score. 
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Gouvier et al. (1992) administered the scales to 100 undergraduate students enrolled in an 
introductory psychology course at two different time points (time-l and time-l plus two months) 
in order to develop the PCSC. The sample consisted of 50 MHI participants and 50 non-injured 
controls, all ranging in age from 18-24 years. Time-l was defmed as 24 hours post-injury for the 
MHI participants. Evidence for convergent validity was found as the four symptoms scores 
correlated well with those from the Postconcussion Checklist (Oddy, Humphrey & Uttley, 1978). 
Regarding discriminant validity, univariate analysis revealed that the head injured students 
endorsed significantly more symptoms than their non-injured counterparts at 24 hours (p < .001) 
,t 
and at two months post-injury (p < .005).2 Evidence for internal consistency in our sample was 
found as indicated by the following reliability coefficients (Cronbach's alpha) for each of the 
four scales: total (.92); frequency (.79); intensity (.75); and duration (.71). 
Individual differences: Verbal self-report of perceived arousal state. 
Participants' current perceived state of arousal was assessed by asking the question, "On 
a scale ranging from 1 (very relaxed) to 1 0 (very stressed), how stressed are you now?" prior to 
administration of Moral Decision making Task and several times throughout the testing session. 
Executive Function measures 
Executive functioning abilities were assessed in terms of working memory, abstract 
reasoning, cognitive flexibility, attention and problem-solving styles using: the Letter-Number 
Sequencing subtest from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale - III (W AIS III) (Wechsler, 
1997), the Pictorial Analogies subset from the Comprehensive Test of Non-verbal Intelligence 
(CTONI) (Hammil, Nils, Pearson, Lee & Wiederholt, 1996), Trails Letter-Number Switching 
2 (Note to committee: these symptoms are assessed as of a function of current experience - i.e. the day of testing: with this restricted 
time period, it has been shown in our lab to demonstrate differences between students who have a history ofMHI and those who do not). 
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subtest from the DKEFS (Delis et aI., 2002), the Stroop Colour-Word Interference subtest from 
the DKEFS (Delis et aI., 2002), and the Social Problem Solving Inventory-Revised (SPSI-R; 
D'Zurilla et aI., 2002). 
Executive Function measures: Mental Control. 
The Mental Control (W AIS-III, 1997) measure is designed to assess working memory and 
the ability to manipulate information 'online'. In this task, participants were asked to perform a 
series of sequencing tasks (e.g., numbersl-20, letters of the alphabet, and days of the week and 
months of the year) as quickly as possible in sequential order. Afterwards, they were asked to 
J 
reproduce these tasks in the reverse order (e.g., count backwards from 20 and say the months of 
the year backwards). Of particular interest was the switching task which required participants to 
count by sixes while saying the days of the week in order. A stopwatch was used to record the 
time (in seconds) of the participant's response. Accuracy was also recorded. 
Executive Function measures: Pictorial Analogies Test (CTONI, 1996). 
The measure is designed to evaluate abstract reasoning skills, problem solving and complex 
decision making. For this task, participants were presented with four quadrants in which two of 
the four quadrants contain pictures depicting an analogous relationship. One of the remaining 
quadrants is left blank while the other quadrant displays a picture that has the potential of 
forming a similar analogous relationship. Participants were required to match the target picture 
selecting one of five choices to reflect the previous pair. Reponses must occur within 30 seconds 
and this was recorded with a stopwatch. Accuracy of responses was also recorded. 
Executive Function measures: Trail-Making (DKEFS, 2002). 
This is a timed paper and pen measure designed to assess sustained attention, working 
memory, sequencing and cognitive flexibility. Participants were required to locate and relate 
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numbers and letters in an alternating sequence (as fast as possible) while keeping the ascending 
and alphabetical order constant (e.g., l-A-2-B, etc). The accuracy and time (in seconds) of the 
participant's response were recorded using a stopwatch. 
Executive Function measures: Stroop Color-Word Interference Test (DKEFS, 2002). 
This measure is designed to assess cognitive flexibility, behavioural inhibition, and 
selective attention while being timed for speed of completion. Participants were given all four 
conditions; however, of particular interest was the inhibition task. Participants were presented 
with the names of several colors and then asked to name the ink color without reading the word 
J 
itself. The number of errors and time of the participant's respOnse were recorded using a 
stopwatch. 
Executive Function measures: Social Problem Solving Inventory-Revised (SPSI-R; 
D'Zurilla et a!., 2002). 
This is a self-report inventory used to measure social problem solving abilities. It consists 
of 52 items with five subscales that measure five dimensions in the D'Zurilla et al. (2002) social 
problem- solving model. These are as follows: i. Positive problem orientation (10 items, e.g., 
"Whenever I have a problem, I believe that it can be solved"); ii. Rational problem solvmg (20 
items, "I spend too much time worrying about my problems instead of trying to solve them"); iii. 
Negative problem orientation (10 items, e.g., "When my first efforts to solve a problem fail, I get 
very frustrated"), iv. Impulsivity/carelessness style (10 items, e.g., "When making decisions, I do 
not evaluate all my options carefully enough"); and v. Avoidance style (7 items, e.g., "I spend 
more time avoiding problems than solving them"). High scores on the positive problem 
orientation (PPO) and rational problem solving (RPS) and low scores on negative problem 
orientation (NPO), avoidance style (AS) and impulsivity/carelessness (ICS) are indicative of 
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adaptive social problem solving ability (D'Zurilla & Chang, 1995). High scores on NPO, AS and 
ICS and low scores on PPO and RPS indicates poor problem solving ability. Additionally, the 
RPS subscale is further sub-divided into four subscales that assess four main problems solving 
skills (each containing 5 items): i. Problem definition and formulation (PDF); ii. Generation of 
alternative solutions (GAS); iii. Decision making (DM); iv. Solution implementation and 
verification (SIV). Participants completed this measure by using a 4-Point Likert scale ranging 
from 0 ("not at all true of me") to 4 ("extremely true of me"). 
Empirical studies of the SPSI-R's psychometric properties have found evidence for 
J 
reliability and construct validity. For example, Kant, D'Zurilla,<and Maydeu-Olivares (1997) 
administered the SPSI-R to 1020 (540 females and 480 males) college students enrolled in an 
introductory psychology course and who had an average age of 18.9 years. Results demonstrated 
internal consistency for the sub-scales as the following Cronbach' s alphas were obtained: PPO 
(.76); NPO (.84); RPS (.87); PDF (.81); GAS (.77); DM (.75); SlY (.76); ICS (.74); and AS 
(.75). Similarly, in our study the following Cronbach's alphas were found: PPO (.80); NPO 
(.92); RPS (.93); PDF (.82); GAS (.80); DM (.78); SIV (.69); ICS (.88); and AS (.78). Further, 
test-retest analysis was conducted by Kant and colleagues (1997) using data from 138 
participants tested over a three-week period obtaining the following reliability coefficients: PPO 
(.72); NPO (.88); RPS (.82); PDF (.75); GAS (.74); DM (.73); SIV (.74); ICS (.78); and AS 
(.78). 
D'Zurilla and Nezu (1990) documented evidence of concurrent validity for the SPSI-R. 
Findings reveal that all of the SPSI-R scales except the PPO and RPS correlated positively with 
the subscales of Problem Solving Confidence, Approach Avoidance Style and Personal Control, 
subscales of the Problem-Solving Inventory (PSI; Heppner, 1988). Finally, D'Zurilla and Nezu 
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(1990) also found that none of the SPSI-R scales were significantly related to academic aptitude 
(r =-.29,p <.01), thereby indicating that the construct measured by SPSI-R did not overlap with 
general intelligence. 
Physiological response measures 
Physiological response measures were evaluated in terms of heart rate (HR), electrodermal 
activity (EDA) and respiration by using Limestone Polygraph Professional Suite software 
(Limestone Technologies Inc., 2007) and a 16" Acer laptop computer. 
Physiological response measures: DR, EDA, respiration. 
/ 
Prior to the decision making task, three minutes of baseline recordings ofHR was 
obtained. During this task, HR was continuously recorded using a pulse oximeter attached to the 
middle phalanges of the non-dominant hand. Anticipatory HR was recorded for the 5 seconds 
prior to the onset of each successive dilemma and before the presentation of the Verbal Self-
report of Perceived Arousal State measure. Onset HR was recorded from the onset of the 
dilemma and for the duration of it being read by the participant. Response HR was then collected 
while the participant responded to the dilemma or the Perceived Arousal State rating question 
followed by a reactionary HR which was collected during 3 seconds after the response made by 
.. 
the participant to the dilemma or to the Perceived Arousal State measure. All were measured as a 
function of frequency in cycles per minute. 
Electrodermal activity (EDA) was also continuously recorded using metal electrodes 
placed on the palmar surface of the index and fourth fingers of the non-dominant hand; as was 
respiratory activity (via placing pneumographs, i.e., rubber electrodes, across the participant's 
chest and abdominal area). These measures were collected during the same epochs as described 
for HR (i.e., anticipatory epoch, onset epoch, reactionary epoch). Respiration was not analyzed 
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owing to technical challenges posed by the polygraph equipment. Measures for each of EDA and 
respiratory activity were amplitude, measured in kilo-ohms (til), and frequency, measured in 
cycles per minute, respectively. The software detected the amplitude of ED A occurring from the 
minimum to the maximum point within each epoch. In addition, the frequency of each measure 
occurring for each cycle per minute within each epoch was assessed. Finally, the mean response 
frequency and amplitude were calculated within each epoch and, after screening for artifacts, 
used as the dependent variables. 
Moral decision making stimuli: Scenarios. 
Decisions were assessed by the moral decision-making task (see Appendix A5) adapted 
from scenarios originated by Green et al. (2001). This task consists of scenarios which depict ( a) 
one of two types of moral dilemma - either (i) deliberate transgression or (ii) unintentional 
transgression; (b) resulting in one of three types of outcome (i) physical harm, (ii) nonphysical 
harm, or (iii) no hannlno moral dilemma. Therefore each dilemma involves an agent (i.e., 
described as the participants themselves) engaging in a course of action who will deliberately, or 
unintentionally, bring about a particular outcome. Physical harm outcomes involve serious 
bodily harm to an individual, while non-physical harm outcomes involve transgressions against 
.. 
another (e.g. stealing money, but not causing physical harm to that person). Non-moral outcomes 
are those that have no moral dilemma presented. 
Thus, participants read a total of 24 scenarios depicting six types of dilemmas (N = 4 
each): (i) unintentional physical harm (e.g., hitting a switch to divert a trolley away from five 
persons towards a bystander person, and ultimately causing the death ofthis person.); (ii) 
deliberate physical harm (e.g., altering the medication of an individual who has vowed to infect 
others with a deadly disease thereby killing him); (iii) unintentional non-physical harm (e.g., 
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confidential information valuable to investors is left unattended and a friend walks in your office, 
sees them and uses them to his or her advantage in the stock market); (iv) deliberate non-
physical harm (e.g., reporting certain personal expenses as business expenses in order to lower 
one's taxes); (v) unintentional non-moral (e.g., administering CPR to bystander caused you to 
take the train instead of the bus); and (vi) deliberate non-moral (e.g., deciding between two 
coupons to use at the bookstore). Participants were asked to rate the likelihood of committing a 
transgression on a 5-point Likert type scale ranging from 0 (Not at all) to 4 (Certain). Primary 
measures of interest were response time (in ms) and the ratings provided by participants. The 
,t 
dilemmas were presented on a Macintosh iBook PowerPC in the form of a PowerPoint 
presentation. 
Moral decision making stimuli: Self-report of justification for moral decisions. 
At the end of the testing session, participants were asked to provide justifications for their 
decisions regarding two dilemmas. (i.e., "Preventing the Spread" and the "Standard Trolley") 
from the Moral Decision Making Task. These dilemmas were chosen because they capture the 
difference between 'unintentional' and 'deliberate 'violations. They completed this measure by 
briefly answering the following question, "How did you arrive at your answer for this dilemma?" 
Participants' answers were coded using aspects of Hauser et al.'s (2007) coding scheme: (i) 
sufficient justification; (ii) insufficient justification - deontological and utilitarian explanations 
acknowledged; (iii) insufficient justification - deontological explanation only; (iv) insufficient 
justification - utilitarian explanation only; (v) insufficient justification - "gut feeling"; and (iii) 
discountable justification. A sufficient justification accurately identifies any factual disparity 
between the two scenarios and acknowledges these differences as the basis for moral decisions. 
Conversely, an insufficient justification fails to identify a factual difference between the two 
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scenarios (e.g., "I don't know how to explain it."), but acknowledges an explanation that either 
provides deontological, utilitarian, or both, reasons for their rating or refers to a 'gut 
feeling'/feels right vague reference. Finally, a discountable justification involves responses that 
are either blank: or provide assumptions that are discounted (e.g., "a man's body cannot stop a 
train"). 
Procedure 
Upon arrival at the laboratory, the participants were met by the researcher and commended 
for their willingness to participate in the study. Participants were told that the purpose of the 
J 
study was to examine the influence of several indicators of individual differences (e.g., 
personality, arousal levels, and cognitive skills) on moral decision-making. Additionally, they 
were told that they would complete several questionnaires and a decision making task while their 
HR, EDA and respiratory activity are recorded. Immediately following the procedures 
establishing consent, the researcher prepared the participants for the application of the electrodes, 
oximeter and pneumographs. Participants' hands were fITst cleansed with sanitary wipes. 
Application took at most 5 minutes, while the participants' feedback regarding their comfort 
level or concerns with the equipment were addressed. 
Before the participants were'tested, the pro'cedures of physiological data collection were 
described and shown to them. During this time, they were instructed to relax and remain as still 
as possible throughout the recordings and the experimenter recorded 3 minutes of ED A, HR and 
respiratory baseline activity. 
The participants were introduced to the moral dilemma stimuli, which was presented by the 
computer screen placed on the table approximately 12 cm away. After focusing on a fixation 
cross for at least 2 seconds and a green screen that signaled 5 seconds of anticipatory recordings, 
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each dilemma appeared one slide at a time and was read aloud (via a recording on the computer) 
to the participant at a pace of 145 words per minute using power point recording applications 
(Microsoft Power point, 2007). The PowerPoint recordings were used to control each 
participant's exposure to the material. After the stimuli had been presented, a second slide posed 
the question about the likelihood of engaging in the action described in that scenario (e.g., 'How 
likely would it be that you would carry out this particular course of action?') and they indicated 
their response by key press. Participants then focused on a blue screen that imputed a 3-second 
delay (permitting reactionary recordings). The stimuli were advanced using an 8-second inter-
J 
trial interval (ITI) before presentation of the next dilemma. A practice scenario was introduced in 
order to familiarize the participants to the procedure. 
Notably, the scenarios were presented to the participants in a series of six blocks of four 
(Latin-square counterbalanced) trials according to the following order: unintentional non-moral; 
deliberate non-moral; unintentional non-physical; deliberate non-physical; unintentional 
physical; and deliberate physical. Essentially, each participant was randomly assigned to one of 
four different versions of the stimuli whereby each dilemma occurred once at each ordinal 
position, and preceded and followed every other dilemma only once. Further, each block of 
stimuli presentation was followed"by an intervaf of 13 seconds for anticipatory responses and the 
completion of the verbal self-report of the perceived arousal state measure. All participants 
received the 24 dilemmas in a single session which lasted approximately 30 minutes. The Visual 
Basic for Applications program (using PowerPoint) recorded the time from the onset of the 
dilemma until the participants made a response. 
Following the completion of the moral dilemma stimuli, the electrodes were removed from 
the participants and their hands were cleansed with sanitary wipes. After a 5- minute rest period, 
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participants completed the Self-report of Justification task which lasted for 3 minutes. Then, the 
neuropsychological tests were administered in the following sequence: 1. Mental Control, 2. 
CTONI, 3.Trails, 4. Stroop. The sequence was maintained across all subjects in order to hold 
constant the amount of fatigue and cognitive load derived from each successive test. Prior to the 
administration of each neuropsychological test, the experimenter provided the participants with 
the relevant instructions. A total of 20 minutes were spent on the completion of these tests. 
After this, participants were given the Social Problem Solving Inventory-Revised, the 
Demographics questionnaire, and the Post-Concussive Symptoms Checklist to complete. These 
J 
took approximately 15 minutes. Following this, the participant was debriefed and thanked for 
his or her participation in the study. The entire session for each participant took approximately 
1.5 hours. 
Data Analysis 
These data were analyzed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) 
software version 18.0. (2010). Assumptions regarding all analyses were explored, discussed and 
where applicable, the appropriate tests (e.g., Greenhouse-Geisser) to correct for violation (e.g., 
homogeneity of variance, sphericity) was used. Ap-value of< 0.05 was considered to be 
significant for all analyses. 
Preliminary analyses (e.g., ANOV A, Chi-square) focused on determining any group 
differences on demographic, pre-injury medical, educational and psychosocial variables that 
might influence subsequent performance on the relevant measures (e.g., moral ratings, executive 
function). Repeated mixed model ANOV As, t-tests, and one-way ANOV As were then conducted 
to address group differences for the primary dependent variables: self-reported measures of 
arousal; ratings and response times to moral dilemmas; and physiological arousal during the 
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decision making task. In addition, Chi-square statistics were used to examine the effects of group 
differences on physical versus non-physical moral ratings. Separate t-tests and one-way 
ANOV As were conducted for each domain of the cognitive measures and for the PCS variables. 
Non-parametric statistics were used where conservative post-hoc analyses for PCS measures 
were appropriate. 
Hierarchical regression analyses were performed to examine the relative contributions of 
physiological arousal variables, executive functioning, and MHI history to predicting 
performance on the moral decision making task. Order of entry for the variables was 
J 
theoretically driven. For this model, physiological variables were entered on the ftrst step as 
these variables have been shown to influence decision-making (Bechara et aI., 2000). Executive 
functioning measures were entered on the second step as one's ability to anticipate, consider 
multiple variables/scenarios/outcomes simultaneously, or appreciate alternative perspectives 
simultaneously, could place limits on one's ability to evaluate (ref) and judge complex problems 
and can, therefore, influence performance on decisions made to moral dilemmas. Finally, MHI 
history was entered on the third step since it was the aim of the study to ascertain if this variable 
was related to moral decision-making. 
A mediation analysis was conducted using three regression analyses to determine the 
presence of a mediating relationship as depicted in Figure 4. These included the following: (i) 
ratings to moral dilemmas were regressed on MHI history; (ii) HR was regressed on MHI 
history; and (iii) ratings to moral dilemmas were regressed on both MHI status and HR measures. 
Partial eta-square effect sizes were reported. Owing to the exploratory nature of this study, 
adjustments were not made to correct for Type 1 error. All the major analyses included sex as a 
covariate and this was not found to impact performance. 
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Results 
Demographic data: History of MID 
Of the 24 students who reported a MHI, 14 (58.3%) experienced LOC. Ten students 
(41.6%) reported experiencing a LOC for less than 5 minutes, 3 (12.5%) reported a LOC greater 
than 5 minutes and less than 30 minutes, and 1 (4.1%) was unconscious for more than 30 
minutes but less than a week. According to Kay et al.'s (1993) criteria of MTBI of LOC ::; 30 
minutes duration, the entire sample excepting one participant (Case 147) would be classified as 
having a MHI. Note, analyses were conducted for each outcome including, and excluding, Case 
J 
147 and the resulting outcomes were the same. As a result, the 'd.ata for this subject were retained. 
Eight (33.3%) of the 24 students who reported a experiencing a MHI, also indicated having 
had a prior head injury (i.e., reported two injuries). The characteristics of these injuries are 
illustrated in Table 3. 
Table 3 
Injury Characteristics and Etiology of Mild Hedd Injuries 
Most current MHI 
n % 
Number of students 24 100.0 
Loss of consiousness 14 58.3 
Less than 5 minutes 10 41.6 
More than 5 minutes but 3 12.5 
Previous MHI 
n 
8 
8 
6 
2 
% 
33.3 
100.0 
75.0 
25.0 
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less than 30 minutes 
More than 30 minutes but 1 4.1 0 0.0 
less than a week 
Concussion 15 62.5 8 100.0 
Received medical treatment 11 45.8 4 50.0 
Stitches 3 12.5 0 0.0 
Overnight stay at medical facility 5 20.8 1 12.05 
Causes of injuries 
( 
Sporting activities 12 25.0 7 87.50 
Falling 7 14.6 1 2.10 
Motor vehicles accidents 3 6.3 0 0.00 
Other 2 4.2 0 0.00 
Mean age at injury (SD) 14.78 (4.12) 11.63 (4.30) 
Years since injury (SD) 5.87 (4.20) 10.25 (5.54) 
Comparability of matched saml!les 
The MHI and non-injured control groups were compared in order to ascertain whether they 
had been matched effectively. Chi-square analysis revealed that the two groups did not differ in 
terms of gender (i (df= 1, N= 48) = .784,p = .376), education level (i (df= 3, N= 48) = 1.34, 
p = .718), and handedness (i (df= 2, N = 48) = 2.54, p = .280). Likewise, the groups were 
comparable in terms of their age, F (1,46) = 1.87,p = .178. 
In general, students with a history of MHI and non-injured controls responded similarly 
on their use of caffeine, F (1, 25) = 0.07, P = .787 (Mcaffeine = 1.25, SD = .96 vs Mcaffeine = 1.33, 
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SD = .61 per cup), alcohol, F (1, 19.85) = 0.38,p = .540 (Malcohol = 11.69, SD = 6.72 vs Malcohol = 
9.46, SD = 11.01), and relaxation techniques, F (1, 15) = 1.66, p = .216 (Mrelaxation = 2.00, SD = 
2.64 vs Mrelaxation = .75, SD = .70 per week). However, students with a history of MHI (M = 8, SD 
= 5.59) reported consuming more cigarettes on a daily basis than non-injured students, (M = 2, 
SD = 3.25) F (1, 10 = 5.71,p = .038). As well, they reported engaging in more exercise activities 
on a weekly basis than non-injured students, F (1, 34) = 5.73, p = .02, (Mexercise = 4.63, SD = 1.46 
vs Mexercise = 3.53, SD = 1.28). 
Other pre-morbid health indicators such as recreational drugs, sensitivity to perfumes, 
J 
hospitalization for neurological complications and surgeries did not differ as a function of MHI 
history (see Appendix B: Table 4). Likewise, the groups were comparable in terms of their 
history of other neural traumas. However, students with a history of self-reported MHI reported 
being hospitalized for fractures, i (d/= 1, N= 48) = 7.11,p = .001, 41.7% vs 8.3% and illness i 
(d/ = 1, N = 48) = 4.06, p = .04, 50% vs 20.8%, more frequently than non-injured students. 
Notably, reports of arousal across different indicators such as current alertness, stress, mood, 
activity level, typical sleep, and sleep quality did not vary as function of history of MHI (see 
Appendix B: Table 5). 
Regarding self-reported problems for which individuals receive professional diagnosis, both 
groups reported a similar history of psychiatric and neurological complications. Additionally, 
participants' intake of psychoactive drugs for these conditions did not differ by history of MHI. 
Further, both groups reported similar histories of educational assistance (e.g., occupational 
therapist, learning resource teacher and educational assistant, physical therapist and tutor) (see 
Appendix B: Table 4). 
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Several psychosocial measures such as living conditions (e.g., living with roommates, 
parents/guardians, partner, on hislher own) were not differentially reported as a function of MHI 
history (see Appendix B: Table 4). As well, both MHI and No MHI students self-scored 
similarly on the number of university credits currently undertaken, and their enjoyment of 
academics and life's situation (see Appendix B: Table 6). 
Overall, the two groups were comparable. However, the variables of hospitalization for 
fractures and exercise frequency and cigarette smoking history were used as covariates in the 
analysis of baseline physiological arousal and were found to be non-significant (allp's < .05). 
Time of day for testing. 
Participants were tested during the winter semester at three time periods throughout the 
day: morning, afternoon and evening. Chi-square analysis demonstrated that the students were 
equally represented in these testing sessions across the orders of dilemmas for those with (x: (df 
= 6, N = 48) = 6.04, p = .109) and without x: (df = 6, N = 48) = 6.54, p = .419) MHI (refer to 
Tables 7-9). 
A one-way between-subjects ANOV A (time of testing: morning, afternoon, evening) on 
baseline physiological arousal (HR frequency) was conducted to determine if the time of day on 
which the participants were tested impacted b;seline physiological arousal. Results yielded a 
non-significant effect of time of day tested, F (2,44) = .567,p = .571 (see Table 9). 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: It was expected that participants who report a history of MHI would be 
more likely to demonstrate reduced levels of arousal on physiological and self-report measures 
during baseline and decision making performance compared to non-MHI participants. 
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Baseline physiological arousal. 
To test this hypothesis, a one-way between subjects ANOV A on baseline physiological 
arousal (HR frequency) was conducted. Consistent with our expectations, a significant Group 
effect, F (1, 45) = 5.42, p = .020 llp2 = .10, was found, such that participants who reported a 
history of MHI had lowered HR activity (frequency) at baseline (M = 72.25, SD = 11.11) than 
participants who reported no history ofMHI (M= 78.65, SD = 7.23).3 EDA levels produced a 
similar pattern, but were not significant (MHI - M= 0.55, SD = 1.42; no MHI - M= 1.13, SD = 
1.29). 
(' 
Physiological arousal during dilemma manipulation across time. 
To continue testing hypothesis 1, we analyzed the HR activity (frequency) recorded prior 
to (anticipatory) reading each scenario, during the presentation of the scenario, during the 
response ratings and after responding (reactions) to each type of dilemma using four separate 2 
(Group) x 6 (dilemmas) mixed ANOVA design with repeated measures on the last factor. Group 
means and standard deviations for these dependent variables are presented in Tables 10 - 13. 
3 Note, analysis was conducted for only the physiological measure of HR frequency as there were no collection of baseline data for the Verbal Self-report and Perceived Arousal. 
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Table 10 
Group Means and Standard Deviations for Anticipatory HR Activity to Types of Dilemmas 
MHI NoMHI 
Variable M SD M SD 
Unintentional non-moral 75.43 9.98 78.00 7.68 
Deliberate non-moral 73.56 10.18 78.48 7.91 
Unintentional non-physical harm 74.14 9.86 78.43 6.24 
,i 
Deliberate non-physical 73.45 9.32 
-. 
77.96 5.80 
Unintentional physical harm 74.25 8.43 79.42 5.97 
Deliberate physical harm 73.27 10.19 77.93 6.38 
Anticipatory HR. While not significant, consistent with our hypothesis, there was a trend for 
participants with a history of MHI to show lowered anticipatory HR responses than participants 
without a history of MHI, F (1, 45) = 3.58, p = .065, 11p2 = .07. However, there was no 
significant main effect of Type 0: dilemma, r.~ (5, 225) = 1.29, p = 0.274, 11/ = .02, nor was 
there an interaction between Group and Type of dilemma, F"G (5, 230) = 1.07, p = 0.02, 11p2 = 
.02. 
4 Note, for all repeated measures ANOVA designs, Greenhouse-Geisser correction for the violation of spheriCity was employed. 
, 
I 
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Figure 5. Anticipatory Heart Rate Activity (frequency) During Response to Dilemmas by MHI 
History. 
Table 11 
Group Means and Standard Deviations for Onset HR Activity to Types of Dilemmas 
MHI NoMHI 
Variable M SD M SD 
Unintentional non-moral 75.50 9.41 77.60 12.13 
Deliberate non-moral 75.46 9.96 79.42 7.21 
Unintentional non-physical harm' 74.1'7 15.01 79.55 6.29 
Deliberate non-physical harm 75.62 9.90 79.84 6.75 
Unintentional physical harm 76.19 8.90 80.57 5.96 
Deliberate physical harm 75.59 9.47 79.87 5.54 
HR activity during the consideration of dilemmas. Similar to the anticipatory findings, 
again while not significant, there was a trend for participants with a history of self-reported MHI 
to demonstrate lowered HR activity while considering the dilemmas than students who reported 
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no history of MHI, F (1, 45) = 3.00, p = .090, 11/ =.06. Once again, there was no significant 
main effect of Type of dilemma, pOO (5, 225) = 0.91, p = 0.43, 11p2 = .02, nor was there an 
interaction between Group and Type of dilemma, pGG (5,225) = 0.61,p = 0.6111p2 = .01 
-+-MHI 
.; '.' ••••• NoMHI 
Figure 6. Onset Heart Rate Activity (frequency) During Response to Dilemmas by MHI 
History. 
Table 12 
Group Means and Standard Deviations for Response HR Activity to Types of Dilemmas 
MIll NoMHI 
Variable M SD M SD 
Unintentional non-moral 83.86 10.80 86.31 10.88 
Deliberate non-moral 85.85 13.15 86.70 13.15 
Unintentional non-physical harm 85.19 13.18 90.89 12.76 
Deliberate non-physical harm 83.04 12.73 90.27 11.42 
Unintentional physical harm 84.66 10.91 83.2 88.73 
Deliberate physical harm 82.11 11.35 88.78 11.48 
Running head: AROUSAL AND MORAL DECISION MAKING 58 
HR activity during response to dilemmas. Inconsistent with our expectations, there was 
no significant between the groups as a function ofMHI status, F (1,45) = 1.871,p = .177, 11/ = 
.04. In like manner, there was no effect of Type of dilemma, r (5, 2250) = 1.52,p = .199, 11p2 
= .03. However, there was an interaction between Group and Type of dilemma, r (5, 225) = 
2.33, p = .05, ,,/ = .04. Follow-up analysis repeated measures ANOVA's to compare HR 
activity across the Type of dilemmas for non-injured controls was significant, F (5, 110) = 2.97, 
p =.01, 11p2 = .11, but was non-significant for participants with a history of MHI, F (5, 115) = 
0.81,p = .50, 11p2 = .03. 
Pairwise comparisons indicated that participants without prior history of MHI had 
significantly lowered HR activity when making their responses to the unintentional physical 
harm dilemmas when compared to unintentional non-physical harm (p = .05) and deliberate non-
physical violations (p = .02). 
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Figure 7. Response Heart Rate activity (frequency) During Response to Dilemmas by MHI 
History. Note that HR differentiation between dilemmas occurred for the No MHI group only. 
Running head: AROUSAL AND MORAL DECISION MAKING 
Table 13 
Group Means and Standard Deviations for Reaction HR Activity to Types of Dilemmas 
MHI NoMHI 
Variable M SD M SD 
Unintentional non-moral 72.29 9.52 77.86 7.74 
Deliberate non-moral 74.06 11.12 78.71 7.37 
Unintentional non-physical harm 72.32 9.95 73.42 7.57 
Deliberate non-physical harm 73.61 10.25 
-:' 
76.54 6.99 
Unintentional physical harm 74.06 9.85 77.01 6.56 
Deliberate physical harm 72.32 10.41 76.72 8.00 
59 
Reactionary HR activity. University students with a history of self-reported MHI did not 
demonstrate lowered HR during their reactions to the responses made to the dilemmas compared 
to students without MHI, F (1, 45) = 2.59, p = .11. However, a significant effect of Type of 
dilemma, jPo (5, 225) = 2.55, p = .043 was found. Pairwise comparisons indicated that HR 
activity for Unintentional non-physical harm violations were lower compare to Deliberate non-
moral, Deliberate non-physical and Unintentional physical harm violations. However, the 
interaction between MHI Group and Type of dilemma was not significant, jPo (5, 225) = 1.17, P 
= .322. 
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Figure 8. Heart Rate Activity During Response Reaction (frequency) to Dilemmas by MHI 
History. Note that response to dilemmas did not differ with respect to group. 
/ 
Self-report of arousal during dilemma manipulation. 
60 
To further test hypothesis 1, we submitted the self-reported arousal ratings to the six 
categories of dilemmas to a 2 (Group) x 6 (Type of dilemmas) mixed ANOYA design with 
repeated measures on the last factor. The group means and standard deviations for self-reported 
arousal ratings to the six types of dilemmas are shown in Table 14. 
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Table 14 
61 
Group Means and Standard Deviations for Self-reported Arousal Ratings to Types of Dilemmas 
Variable 
Unintentional non-moral 
Deliberate non -moral 
Unintentional non-physical harm 
Deliberate non-physical harm 
Unintentional physical harm 
Deliberate physical harm 
MHI 
M 
2.38 
2.60 
3.17 
3.17 
3.34 
4.34 
SD 
1.31 
1.15 
1.82 
1.87 
2.05 
2.44 
NoMHI 
M SD 
3.36 1.83 
3.13 1.55 
3.36 1.52 
~ 
3.54 1.68 
3.86 2.03 
4.45 2.28 
With respect to self-report of arousal, the Group effect was non-significant, F (1, 43) = 
.858,p = .360, 11/ = .02; however, a significant effect of Type of dilemma, JPG (5, 215) = 16.59, 
p = .0001, 11p2 = .34 was found, such that higher ratings of arousal state were assigned to 
dilemmas leading to serious bodilY harm (e.g., .pushing an injured man overboard) compared to 
other dilemmas: Unintentional non-moral, Deliberate non-moral, Unintentional non-physical, 
Deliberate non-physical. There was no Group by Type of dilemma interaction, JPG (5, 215) = 
1.23, p = .360, 11p2 = .02. 
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Figure 9. Average Stress Ratings to Dilemmas by MHI history. 
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Taken together, these results provide some evidence that -participants with a history of self-
reported MHI produce lowered HR activity relative to their No MHI cohort both at baseline and, 
variably, during certain types of emotionally distressing, or arousing, situations. 
Self-report of life stressors. While not significant, there was a statistical trend for 
students with a history of MHI (M = 138.96, SD = 62.91) to endorse a significantly higher 
number of life stressors such as death of a relative, personal illness and fmancial challenges, than 
students who reported no history of MHI, (M = 98.08, SD = 82.35), t (45) = -1.90, p = .063, 
despite experiencing lowered arousal state as indicated by baseline physiological recordings (HR 
activity). 
Hypothesis 2: It was expected that participants who report a history of MIll would differ from 
non-MHI participants in their decisions and response time on the moral dilemmas: More 
specifically: it was hypothesized that participants with a history of MIll would rate themselves as 
more likely to report that they would commit moral violations independent of the intentionality 
(deliberate or unintentional) and outcome (physical harm, non-physical harm, no harm) of the 
dilemma, and would do so more quickly, than their non-MIll counterparts. 
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Ratings to moral dilemmas. 
To test hypothesis 2, we analyzed the ratings to the six categories of dilemmas using a 2 
(Group) x 2 (Intentionality) x 3 (Moral outcomes) mixed ANOVA design with repeated 
measures on the last two factors. The group means and standard deviations for the ratings to the 
six types of dilemmas are presented in Table 15. 
Table 15 
Group Means and Standard Deviations for Ratings to Types of Dilemmas 
MHI NoMHI 
Variable M SD M SD 
Unintentional non-moral 1.94 0.67 1.99 0.68 
Direct non-moral 1.67 0.72 1.22 0.75 
Unintentional non-physical harm 1.17 0.46 1.33 0.71 
Direct non-physical harm 2.04 0.51 2.19 0.78 
Unintentional physical harm 1.68 0.58 1.43 0.73 
Direct physical harm 1.39 0.98 0.93 0.62 
There was no Group effect for how participants rated their likelihood of engaging in the 
actions described in the dilemma, F (1,46) = .898,p =.35, 11p2 = .01. Likewise, the main effect of 
Intentionality, F (1,46) = .449,p =.51, 11/ = .01, was not significant. However, a significant 
main effect of moral outcomes, F (2,92) = 38.58,p = .001, 11p2 = .45, emerged indicating that 
violations leading to non-moral outcomes were more likely to be endorsed over violations 
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involving non-physical outcomes, which in turn, were more likely to be endorsed over those 
leading to serious bodily harm (p < .001 in all comparisons). A significant Group by 
Intentionality by Moral outcome interaction was also found, F (2,92) = 4.96,p = .001, 11/ = .09 
(see Figure 10). 
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Figure 10. Liklihood of Engaging in transgression by MHI History. Note: follow-up analyses of 
the three-way interaction showed that both groups participants were more willing to report that 
they would commit violations that resulted in non-moral outcomes over those involving non-
physical outcomes, which in turn, were more likely to be committed over physical ones. (see 
figure 11 for further follow-up analyses) 
Follow-up repeated measures ANOVA's showed a non-significant Intentionality by 
Moral outcome interaction for Mill participants: F (2,46) = .461,p = .618, 11p2 = .02, but a 
significant main effect of Moral outcomes, F (2,23) = 13.52,p = .001, 11p2 = .37. In contrast, a 
significant Intentionality by Moral outcome interaction was found for participants who reported 
no history ofMHI, F (2,46) = 8.02,p = .01, 11/ = .25. Follow-up analysis repeated measures 
ANOVA's to compare each level of intentionality for non-injured controls were significant for 
both unintentional, F (2,46) = l4.09,p = .001, T)/ = .38 and deliberate violations, F (2,46) = 
28.38,p = .001, T)p2 = .55. Pairwise comparisons indicated that non-injured controls were more 
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willing to endorse unintentional non-moral violations over those leading to unintentional non-
physical harm (e.g., confidential information valuable to investors was left unattended and a 
friend walks in your office sees them),p = .01 and unintentional physical harm outcomes (e.g., 
turning a runaway trolley away from five persons but towards one person by pressing a switch), 
p = .001, respectively. However, no differences were noted in the ratings to unintentional non-
physical and unintentional physical harm violations, p = .413. 
Regarding the Deliberate dilemmas, post-hoc comparisons indicated that non-injured 
participants were more willing to carry out non-moral violations over those involving non-
J 
physical harm outcomes (e.g., reporting certain personal expenSes as business expenses in order 
to lower one's taxes),p = .01, which in turn were committed more willingly over those violations 
leading to serious bodily harm,p = .001 (see Figure 11). 
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Figure 11. Average Endorsement Ratings to Deliberate (deliberate) Dilemmas for both no MHI 
and MID Students. Note; deliberate non-moral violations were more likely to be committed over 
deliberate non-physical, which in turn was more likely to be committed over deliberate physical 
only for non-injured students (*p <.05) 
Pairwise comparisons showed that for participants with a history of MHI, violations 
leading to non-moral outcomes (e.g., choosing to use walnuts over macadamia nuts in a recipe) 
were more likely to be endorsed over non-physical ones (e.g. stealing), p = .05, and those 
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resulting in physical hann,p = .001. Non-physical harm violations, in turn, were more likely to 
be endorsed over transgressions resulting in serious bodily hann (e.g., pushing a drowning man 
overboard),p = .02. 
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Figure 12. Average Endorsement Ratings to the Type of Dilemma outcome Scenarios for MHI 
and no MHI students. Note; non-moral violations were more likey to be committed over non-
physical hann outcomes,which were more likely to be committed over physical harm outcomes 
for both groups of participants (*p<.05). 
When the ratings were examined as a function of comparing endorsement of the action or 
not (i.e., ratings of2: 1 versus 0), the pattern of results was similar. 
When the ratings were examined as a function of which type of moral action was more 
likely to be endorsed (nonphysical or physical hann) as a function of Intentionality, more MHI 
participants endorsed deliberate actions associated with physical harm outcomes (i (df = 1, N = 
23) = 7.74,p = .007) than the non-injured participants (see Figure 13). 
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Figure 13. Percentage of Participants who Endorsed Engaging in Deliberate over Unintentional 
actions as a Function of Physical Harm Outcomes for both MHI and No MHI students 
Thus, the above results provide support for our hypothesis that participants with a history 
of MHI would not be sensitive to the intentionality of the transgressions committed compared to 
non-injured controls. However, they were more sensitive to outcomes of the transgressions. Of 
note, participants with a history of MHI were more inclined, albeit subtle, to authorize deliberate 
violations that led to physical harm outcomes. 
Response times to moral dilemmas. 
To further test hypothesis 2, the response-'times to the six ~ategories of dilemmas were 
analyzed using a 2 (Group) x 2 (Intentionality) x 3 (Dilemma outcomes) mixed ANOVA design 
with repeated measures on the last factor. The group means and standard deviations for the 
ratings to the six types of dilemmas are presented in Table 16. 
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Table 16 
Group Means and Standard Deviations for Response Times to Types of Dilemmas 
Variable 
Unintentional non-moral 
Deliberate non-moral 
Unintentional non-physical harm 
Deliberate non-physical harm 
Unintentional physical harm 
Deliberate physical harm 
MHI 
M 
2.92 
2.31 
3.03 
2.26 
2.80 
2.73 
SD 
1.02 
0.57 
1.15 
0.97 
1.14 
1.38 
NoMHI 
M SD 
3.80 1.74 
2.39 0.93 
2.79 1.22 
f 
2.24 0.84 
2.80 1.14 
2.38 0.93 
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Results from this analysis produced no Group effect, F (1, 46) = .282, p = .60, IIp 2 = .001, 
for the time participants took to respond to the dilemmas. However, there was an overall effect of 
Dilemma outcomes, F (2, 92) = 3.34, p = .04, IIp 2 = .06. Pairwise comparisons indicated only a 
trend toward faster response times for violations associated with non-physical outcomes 
• -> 
compared to non-moral outcomes. There was an effect of Intentionality, F (1,46) = 33.30,p = 
.001, llp2 = .42, indicating that faster decisions responses were given to the violations associated 
with deliberate actions than those that were unintentional. A significant Group by Intentionality 
by Dilemma outcomes interaction was also found, F (2,92) = 4.24,p < .017, llp2 = .08 (see 
Figure 14) 
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Figure 14. Response Time (in seconds) to Moral Dilemmas by MHI History. Note, both groups 
of participants took a long time to respond to unintentional non;moral dilemmas relative to rest 
of dilemmas. As well, both groups of participants responded more quickly to unintentional 
physical harm dilemmas compared to the rest of dilemmas, *p <.05 
Follow-up repeated measures ANOVA's showed a significant Intentionality by Moral 
outcome interaction for both MHI participants, F (2,46) = 9.03,p = .001, 11p2 = .28 and non-
injured controls, F (2,46) = 7.67,p = .001, 11p2 = .25. No MHI participants produced a 
significant effect for unintentional violations, F (2,46) = 8.71,p = .001, 11/ = .27, but not 
deliberate violations, F (2,46) = .46,p = .63, 11p2 = .02; whereas participants with a history of 
MHI produced a significant effect·for both unintentional violatio!ls, F (2,46) = 4.51,p< .016, 
11p2 = .16 and deliberate violations, F (2,46) = 3.03,p = .05, 11p2 = .11. 
Pairwise comparisons indicated that participants who sustained a MHI made faster 
responses to unintentional violations leading to serious physical harm compared to those leading 
to non-physical harm outcomes,p = .05 and non-moral outcomes,p = .034. However, no 
differences emerged in the response times between unintentional non-moral violations and 
unintentional non-physical harm violations. Pairwise comparisons also showed no differences in 
the response time among deliberate violations. 
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Non-injured participants made faster responses to unintentional violations that led to 
serious bodily harm than to those resulting in non-moral outcomes, p = .004. Faster responses 
were given to unintentional transgressions that involved non-physical harm outcomes than to 
those leading to non-moral outcomes,p = .001. However, there were no differences in the 
response times between unintentional non-physical and unintentional physical harm violations. 
In summary, the above results provide some support, albeit subtle, for our hypothesis that 
participants with a history of MHI would respond more quickly to the violations relative to non-
injured controls. Indeed, they only responded faster to violations that were cOImnitted 
unintentionally and led to physical harm. 
Self-report of justification for moral decisions 
Participants' explanations were first analyzed by computing the proportions of responses 
to each justication sub-category. To detect any group differences in the participants 
explanations, chi-square tests were performed. 
Participants generally gave "insufficient justification" when providing explanations for 
their moral decisions. Overall, only 8% provided a "discounting" explanation, while 92% 
provided some acknowledgement of a utilitarian or moral conflict. No students provided a 
"sufficient" justification that acmowledged a discrepancy between the intentionality of the . 
scenarios presented. Participants without a MHI were more likely to acknowledge a moral 
dilemma in their justification (40%) than MHI students (28%), whereas MHI participants were 
more likely to acknowledge a strictly utilitarian explanation for their choices (14%) as compared 
to their no MHI cohort (8%), (t (df= 4, N= 23) = 23.l6,p = .001) (see Table 17). 
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Table 17 
Descriptive Statistics (percentages) Justification Ratings as a function of ~I Status 
Justification no~I ~I 
Sufficient Justification 0.0 0.0 
InsufficientlPartial Justification 95.0 86.1 
Utilitarian+Deontological 47.5 41.7 
Deontologicalonly 40.0 27.8 
Utilitarian only 7.5 ~ ~ 13.9 
-. 
'Gut' feeling 0.0 2.8 
Discountable Justification 5.0 13.9 
Executive Function performance 
Social Problem Solving Inventory-Revised (SPSI-R; D'Zurilla et al., 2002). 
Participants' ratings to each subscale of the SPSI-R measure were analyzed using separate one-
way ANOV As. Results showed that both groups of participants viewed themselves equally in 
terms of their overall social problem solving capacities, F (1, 46) = .589,p = .442, llp2 = .01. 
Further, results also showed that the groups were comparable in terms of how they viewed 
themselves with respect to the other problem solving dimensions (e.g., positive problem 
orientation, rational problem solving, negative problem orientation, impulsivity/carelessness 
style and avoidance style) of the social problem solving model (see Appendix B: Table 43). 
Thus, MHI participants' social reasoning abilities were similar to non-injured controls thereby 
confirming no pronounced differences in the groups' abilities to solve the social dilemmas. 
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Hypothesis 3: It was expected that a history of MHI would be reflected by reduced arousal 
levels and it is this lowered physiological feedback that influences one's decision making. 
Therefore, MHI status would be indirectly related to decision making as a function of 
physiological arousal. 
Mediation of moral ratings by HR activity 
The hypothesized mediating role of arousal (HR activity during the onset of dilemma) 
between MHI history and moral decision making could not be fully examined as there was no 
relationship between history of MHI and deliberate physical harm ratings nor between ratings 
:" 
and HR activity. The descriptive statistics and correlation for these variables are presented in 
Table 18 and Table 20 respectively. Interestingly, there was a significant negative relationship 
between MHI status and the subject's heart rate activity for deliberate physical harm 
endorsement, indicating that participants with a history of self-report MHI demonstrated lowered 
HR activity. 
Table 18 
Descriptive Statistics for Deliberate Physical Harm Ratings, HR activity (Onset), and MHI 
Status 
Variable n M SD 
Deliberate physical harm 48 1.15 0.83 
HRactivity 48 77.30 8.29 
MHI history 48 0.51 0.50 
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Table 19 
Correlations Among Deliberate Physical Harm Ratings, HR activity, and MIff Status 
Variable 
Deliberate physical hann 
HR activity 
MHI history 
*p < .05 
1 2 
-.17 
3 
.27 
-.34* 
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As well, the mediation model involving unintentional physical harm ratings could not be 
examined as there were no relationships among history of MHI, unintentional physical hann 
ratings and HR activity. The descriptive statistics and correlation for the variables are presented 
in Table 20 and Table 21. Again, there was a significant relationship between MHI status and the 
subject's heart rate activity. All other variables were reviewed and demonstrated a similar 
pattern. 
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Table 20 
Descriptive Statistics for Unintentional Physical Harm Ratings, HR activity (Onset), and MIff 
Status 
Variable n M SD 
Unintentional phys. hann 48 1.26 0.60 
HR activity 48 77.30 8.29 
MHI history 48 0.51 0.50 
Table 21 
Correlations Among Unintentional Physical Harm Ratings, HR activity, and MIff Status 
Variable 1 2 3 
Unintentional phys. hann .04 .28* 
HRactivity -.34* 
MHI history 
p* ~ .05 
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Hypothesis 4: It was expected that MIff participants would be more likely to perform poorly on 
test of executive functioning that tap cognitive flexibility, working memory and attention when 
compared to non-MIff participants, and may be reflected in differences in moral decision 
making. 
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To assess the validity of this hypothesis, separate one-way ANOV As were used to 
analyze the response times, accuracy, self-corrected and uncorrected errors for the relevant 
domain of the cognitive measures. 
Cognitive flexibility. Inconsistent with expectations that participants with a history of self-
report MHI would performed poorly on tests of cognitive flexibility, results showed that 
participants with a history of self-reported MHI were more accurate (Maccuracy = 3.83, SD = .86 vs 
Maccuracy = 3.33, SD = .63), F (1,46) = 5.17, P = .028, l1p 2 = .10, and faster (Mspeed = 4.12, SD = 
1.36 vs Mspeed = 4.94, SD = .87), F (1,46) = 6.l7,p = .017, l1p2 = .11, than non-injured 
.( 
participants in their responses on the 'number task' which involved repeating a list of numbers in 
sequential order (see Figures 15 and 16, and Appendix B: Table 44). 
MHIHist.oI'Y 
Figure 15. Accuracy score for Me-number task (WAIS-III, 1997) as a function ofMHI history. 
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:MID History 
Figure 16. Response Time for MC-number Task as a Function ofMHI History 
Similarly, participants who report a history of MHI were more accurate (Maccuracy = 3.17, SD 
= .56 vs Maccuracy = 2.79, SD = .50), F (1,46) = 5.84,p = .020, llp2 = .11, and faster (Mspeed = 
2.16, SD = .56 vs Mspeed = 2.74, SD = .79), F (1,46) = 8.47,p = .006, llp2 = .15, than non-injured 
participants on the 'days task' which involved repeating the days of the week in sequential order 
(see Figures 17 and 18). 
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Figure 17. Response Time to Complete MC-days Task as a Function of Mill History. 
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Figure 18. Accuracy Score to Complete MC-days Task as a Function ofMHI History. 
Working memory. Inconsistent with our expectations, participants with a history ofMHI 
did not differ from non-injured controls on the 'Trail Making number task' (DKEFS, 2002), (see 
Appendix B: Table 45) . 
Abstract reasoning. Contrary to expectations, there were no significant differences in the 
groups' abstract reasoning capacities, F (1,43) =.460,p> = .05, 11p2 = .09, and the time taken, F 
(1,26) = .635,p > .05,11/ = .02, to respond to the Pictorial Analogies Test (CTONI, 1996) (see 
Appendix B: Table 46). 
Attention. The Colour-Word Interference subtest (DKEFS, 2002) differentiated students 
with a history ofMHI from non-injured controls. Students with a history of self-reported MHI 
performed faster (Mspeed = 2.16, SD = .56 vs Mspeed = 2.74, SD = .79), F (1, 45) = 3.98, p = .052, 
11p2 = .08, on the colour naming task (see Figure 19) (see Appendix B: Table 47); but no other 
differences were found. 
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Figure 19. Response Time to Complete the Stroop Colour Naciing Task as a Function ofMHI 
History 
Taken together, these findings did not provide evidence that participants with a history of 
MHI would perform more poorly on neurocognitive tests assessing cognitive flexiblity, working 
memory, abstract reasoning and attention. 
To further test the hypothesis that executive functioning measures would be related to 
ratings, a multiple hierarchical regression analysis was conducted in which unintentional non-
physical harm ratings was regressed on HR activity (onset) on step 1, followed by executive 
functioning measures on step 2 and MHI status on the third step . 
.. 
It must be noted that prior to conducting the hierarchical multiple analysis regression 
analysis, several assumptions (e.g., independence of residuals, normality of residuals, 
homoscedasticity, linearity) were explored, but were not fully satisfied (e.g., linearity, 
homoscedasticity). Thus, the results must be interpreted with caution. The means and standard 
deviations of the variables included in this model are displayed in Table 22. 
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Predictors of moral decision making. 
Table 22 
Descriptive Statistics for Unintentional Non- Physical Harm Ratings, HR activity 
(Onset), Executive Functioning Measures and MHI Status 
Variable n M SD 
Unintentional non phys. rat. 46 1.43 0.76 
Unintentional nonmor HRact.46 76.99 9.07 
Deliberate non mor. HR act. 46 77.02 8.84 
J 
Uninten. Non phys. HR act. 46 ii.22 8.89 
Deliberate non phys HR act. 46 77.03 8.61 
Uninten. phys. HR activity 46 77.82 8.00 
Deliberate phys HR activity 46 77.10 7.80 
MC- Number. response time 46 4.55 1.20 
MC- Number accuracy 46 3.57 0.77 
MC- Days response time 46 2.43 0.75 
MC-Days accuracy 46 2.98 0.57 
Stroop-Color naming time 46 28.20 4.80 
Stroop-Color naming acc. 46 0.13 0.40 
MHI status 46 0.48 0.50 
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The correlations among the variables are displayed in Table 23. The results of the 
hierarchical multiple regression are presented in Table 24. Overall, 48% of the variability in 
unintentional non-physical harm ratings was accounted for by HR activity during the 
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consideration of the scenarios, executive measures and MHI history, F (14,31) = 2.04,p = .048. 
As depicted in Table 24, HR activity during the onset of the scenarios for the deliberate non-
physical harm dilemmas significantly and independently predicted unintentional non-physical 
harm ratings, (p = .05), while the other variables together with this same variable accounted for 
23% of the variability in unintentional non-physical harm ratings, for step 2, FIl(6, 39) = 2.04, p 
= .08. Executive functioning measures such as Me-Number accuracy did not significantly 
improve the prediction of unintentional non-physical harm ratings in block 2, FIl (7, 32) = 1.44, 
p = .22. However, MHI history uniquely improved the model's prediction by 5.8% in step 3, FIl 
(1,31) = 3.44,p = .07. 
It must be noted that the multiple hierarchical regression analyses for the ratings of the 
other three moral dilemma scenarios (deliberate non-physical harm, unintentional physical harm 
and deliberate physical) was regressed on HR activity (onset) on step 1, followed by executive 
functioning measures on step 2 and MHI status on the third step, and were not significant (see 
Appendix B: Tables 48-56). Therefore, our findings did not provide evidence that executive 
functioning would predict moral decision-making. 
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Table 23 
Inter-correlations of Participants' Unintentional Non-Physical Harm Ratings with HR Activity (Onset), Executive Functioning 
Measures and MIll Status 
N=46 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Unint. Non P ratings -.01 -.10 -.08 -.17 -.02 -.03 -.21 .34*** -.03 -.16 .16 -.05 -.24* .28* 
Unint. Non mor. HR .95*** .93*** .91 **.92**.87*** .31*** -.30* .37** -.24** .06 .25* -.32 -.20 
Deli. Non mor. HR .93*** .94***.90*** .89*** .29* -.29* .35***-.17 .04 . 24 -.28*-. 19 
Unint. Non P HR .93*** .91*** .88*** .25 -.23 .26 .20 .07 .24 -.31* .20 
Deli. Non P HR .85*** .87*** .31**-.30** .34** -.18 .04 .24* -.23 -.20 
Unint.P HR .91 *** .28 -.26 .34 -.26 .17 .25* -.33 -.23** 
Delib. Phys.HR .28* -.24* .32* -.23* .20 .30* -.28* -.22* 
MC-Number response time -.84* .24 -.20 .17 .30 .06 -.33* 
, ' " 
.... 
MC-Number accuracy . 20 .22 .03 -.19 -.17 .31 * 
MC-Days response time -.54*** .20 .15 -.04 -.44*** 
MC-Days accuracy .01 -.11 .01 .34* 
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Table 23 Continued 
Inter-correlations of Participants' Unintentional Non-Physical Harms Ratings with HR Activity, Executive Functioning Measures and 
MHI Status 
Trails-Number accuracy .14 -.08 -.25 
Stroop-Color naming response time -.10 -.26 
Stroop-Color naming UC 
-.31 * 
MHI status 
*p <.05 
**p < .01 
***p < .001 
" 
83 
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Table 24 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Unintentional Non-Physical Harms 
Ratings from HR Activity, Executive Functioning Measures and MHI Status 
Predictor B L1R2 FL1 df p sr 
Step 1 
Unint.N Mor HR activity 0.94 0.80 0.23 2.04 6,39 .08 0.06 
Deli. N Mor HR activity -0.47 -0.04 0.01 
Unint. N P HR activity -0.12 -0.01 0.00 
( 
Deli. N P HR activity -1.02 -0.09 0.07 
Unint. P HR activity -0.05 -0.00 0.00 
Deli. Phy HR activity 0.68 0.06 0.05 
Step 2 
MC-Number time 0.20 0.12 0.18 1.44 7,32 .00 0.00 
Me-Number accuracy 0.52 0.51 0.06 
MC-Days time -0.20 -0.21 0.02 
MC-Days accuracy -0.28 -0.37 0.04 
Trails Number error 0.08 0.25 0.00 
Stroop-Color naming time -0.07 -0.01 0.00 
Stroop-Color naming UC -0.11 -0.22 0.01 
Step 3 
MHI status 0.32 0.49 0.05 3.44 1,31 .25 0.01 
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Hypothesis 5: It was expected that students with a history of MIfI would report even more pes, 
with greater frequency, with greater intensification and for longer periods of time than non-
injured students. 
Endorsement of Post-concussive Symptoms 
Separate independent t-tests indicated no significant differences in the groups' endorsement 
for the duration, t (37.07) = -0.66,p = .509, intensity, t (37.43) = -0.58,p = .559, and frequency, t 
(34.65) = -O.27,p = .781, ofPCS symptoms. Likewise, there were no significant differences in 
the groups' overall experience ofPCS complaints, t (35.11) = -0.52,p = .603 (see Figures 20-24) 
J (refer to Appendix B: Table 57). Thus, these results did not provide support our hypothesis. 
Mann-Whitney U tests were conducted on the differences in the endorsement of 
concentration challenges experienced by the participants. Results showed that the two groups 
did not differ significantly in the frequency, z = -0.04,p = .965, intensity, z = -0.06,p = .947, nor 
duration, z = -0.60, p = .548, of these symptoms. Likewise, separate Mann-Whitney U tests also 
showed no group differences in the endorsement of other types of PCS complaints (e.g., 
headache, irritability, fatigue, judgment, memory and anxiety (refer to Appendix B: Tables 58-
60). 
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Summary of results 
After applying Kay et al. 's (1993) criteria for a MHI, it was found that 33% of university 
students in the sample reported a MHI with females making up 54% of this number. The 
majority incurred their injury from sports-related activities and falls at the age of 15 years. In 
terms of injury characteristics, 33.3% of these students reported an additional head injury while 
more than half reported LOC, for which the majority experienced for less than 5 minutes. 
Interestingly, less than half of these students received medical attention. 
Both groups were generally the same with respect to reports of overall PCS and the 
J 
qualitative aspects for which these symptoms were experienced. Contrary to expectations, 
students with a history of self-reported MHI performed comparably, and even better, on tasks 
assessing cognitive flexibility, working memory and attention compared to students who did not 
report a MHI. 
Consistent with expectations, university students with a history of self-reported MHI did 
not differentiate between the intentionality of the violations when compared to non-injured 
controls. However, they differentiated among violations leading to non-moral, physical harm and 
non-physical harm violations similar to non-injured students. Essentially, they were more likely 
to report that they would commit non-moral viol~tions over transgressions resulting in non-
physical harm outcomes, which in turn were more likely to be authorized over dilemmas that led 
to serious physical harm. Further, they were noted to report that they would be more willing to 
commit deliberate violations that led to physical harm outcomes, albeit subtly. 
Regarding reaction times to the dilemmas, fmdings were inconsistent with our hypothesis, 
as there were no differences in the reaction times to the dilemmas, excepting those that were 
committed unintentionally and which led to physical harm outcomes. 
87 
Running head: AROUSAL AND MORAL DECISION MAKING 
University students with prior history ofMHI demonstrated lowered physiological arousal 
(HR activity) responses at baseline, which tended to be evident across the study (prior to, i.e., 
anticipatory, and during the consideration of each type of dilemma). 
Regarding the relative contributions of cognitive skills, physiological responding and MHI 
history as predictors of moral decision making, results showed that HR activity (onset) 
significantly predicted unintentional non-physical harm ratings, independent of cognitive skills 
and MHI history. 
Discussion 
The aim for the present study was to replicate and extend Chiappetta and Good's (2010) 
study by exploring the relationship between MHI and moral decision-making in university 
students. Additionally, individual differences in cognitive, physiological responsivity, social 
reasoning and PCS were examined as they related to MHI and the kinds of moral decisions made 
by university students. 
The overall prevalence of self-reported MHI was 33% of the original sample. One-third of 
the MHI students reported having more than one head injury. This is comparable to the incidence 
rate for head injury in a similar population ofuciversity students· found by others (e.g., 
Segalowitz & Lawson, 1995; Baker & Good, 2007) using the Kay et aL's (1993) liberal 
defmition ofMHI. Notably, fewer than half of the sampled individuals indicated that they had 
received medical attention, while 12.5% of the students reported receiving stitches and 21 % 
stayed overnight at a medical care facility. Our data for prevalence ofMHI is greater than those 
generally obtained from hospital records and indicates a more substantial proportion of 
individuals with a history ofMHI than those reported elsewhere (Bazarian, et aI., 2005). We 
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attribute this to being a reflection of the prevalence rate for MHI on the basis of Kay et aI. 's 
(1993) more liberal criteria. 
The age at injury for the most recent (15 to 20 years) and for an additional previous 
trauma (2 years earlier) is consistent with previous findings which have documented a peak 
occurrence in children and young adults relative to other age ranges (e.g., Cassidy et aI., 2004; 
McKinlay et aI., 2008; Ryan et aI., 1996; Segalowitz & Lawson, 1995; Dzyundzyak, Baker & 
Good, 2010). However, in our sample, the gender bias for more males than females reporting a 
MHI observed in prior findings (e.g., Langlois et aI., 2006) was not found. However, 
J 
proportionally, there were more males in the MHI than in the rion-MHI group. This likely 
reflects the sampling/recruitment bias of the experiment such that more females volunteered to 
participate in the study consequent on the unequal representation of females over males in the 
university population. 
The major causes of injuries in the study were sport-related activities followed by falling. 
Other studies (e.g., CIHI, 2006) have placed falls, followed by motor vehicle accidents as the 
leading causes ofMHI among youth and children. However, most epidemiological studies are 
based on hospital visits and admissions whereas in our study participants were, by definition; 
selected for the milder injuries ana MHIs resulti~g from sports-related injuries typically involve 
lesser physical and acceleration-deceleration forces than those resulting from motor vehicles 
accidents (Ruffolo, Friedland, Dawson, Colantonio & Lindsay, 1999). Finally, the leading causes 
of injuries and the fact that the majority (41.6%) of participants who were reported to have lost 
consciousness, experienced LOC for less than 5 minutes, endorsed the view that these injuries 
met the guidelines outlined by Kay et aI. 's (1993) definition and therefore can be considered 
mild. 
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Regarding the endorsement of PCS, [mdings from this study did not support the hypothesis 
that university students with a history of MHI would report more PCS and would complain about 
these symptoms more frequently, with greater intensity and for longer durations than non-injured 
students. While other studies have found PCS differences in these milder samples (e.g., 
Dzyndziak, Baker & Good, 2010; Baker & Good, 2010), it remains possible that the PCSC 
(Gouvier, 1992) was not a sufficiently sensitive or reliable measure to detect differences, 
especially since our population is at the milder end of the spectrum. Further, our participants 
were well-functioning individuals and may have adapted to any subtle symptoms having been 
J 
able to adjust to the stressful rigors of academic life such that the PCSC was unable to detect 
variations in the sample. However, it is also possible that the injuries suffered by our sample did 
not result in persistent biochemical changes or disruption to brain function such that any PCS in 
the head injured group was largely resolved within 3 months (e.g., Levin et aI., 1987; McCrea et 
aI., 2003; Rutherford et aI., 1979). 
Interestingly, and as expected, students with prior history ofMHI were also found to be 
physiologically under-aroused relative to their non-injured cohorts at baseline. They also tended 
to demonstrate lowered HR activity prior to, and during (but not after) making a decision for 
each type of dilemma but only weakly. This is so' despite a tendency to endorse more life 
stressors, such as the death of a loved one and financial difficulties. These data partially replicate 
prior [mdings (e.g., Baker & Good, 2010; van Noordt & Good, 2010) and highlight the 
dissociation between implicit autonomic measures of affective responsiveness to environmental 
stressor and explicit measures of affective reactivity to environmental stressors. These results 
also provide support, albeit subtle, for the hypothesis of possible disruption to the neural 
pathways of the VMPFC/OFC, the limbic, periaqueductal grey area, and the hypothalamus, 
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regions responsible for physiological and emotional information processing and regulation 
similar to patterns observed in persons with more moderate to severe VMPFC injuries (Tranel & 
Damasio, 1994; Koenigs et aI., 2007). 
In conjunction with differences in physiological arousal at baseline between the MHI and 
non-MHI groups, findings from this study also lend some support for the Somatic Marker 
Hypothesis (Damasio, 1996; Damasio, Grabowski, Frank, Galaurda, & Damasio, 1994) because 
students with prior history ofMHI were more willing than their non-injured cohort to report that 
they would commit emotionally charged direct physical harm violations (that resulted in 
, f 
utilitarian benefits). This is consistent with the view that having reduced physiological arousal 
interferes with the physiological feedback elicited in emotional situations being able to signal 
caution, and ultimately influence decisions made, in those circumstances, similar to that found in 
past investigations (e.g., Bechara, et aI., 2000; Chiappetta & Good, 2010; Koenigs et aI., 2007; 
Ciaramelli et aI., 2007). 
The results in our study are more subtle. For example, there was no interaction effect of the 
type of moral decision to be made by MHI status; nor were there any significant differences in 
the time it took to make decisions. Further, there were no differences in physiological arousal 
noted prior to these emotionally arousing dile~as excepting for the self-report of arousal state 
measure. Given that the amount of axonal injury is proportional to the severity level of the 
impact (Kushner, 1998), it is understandable that individuals with mild trauma demonstrate less 
profound disruptions in emotional regulation as compared to individuals with more moderate to 
severe injuries to the VMPFC areas. Further, other brain regions, such as the amygdala which 
plays a key role in emotional processing, would not be expected to be adversely affected by 
MHI. Thus, in spite of evidence of lowered physiological responsivity at baseline, unlike 
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persons with severe VMPFC injury, there remain emotional cues available to students with a 
history of MHI. As such, they were able to experience some amount of the negative emotional 
consequences (e.g., feeling guilty and regretful) associated with the thought of causing harm to 
another person, and consequently engaged more frequently in utilitarian decision making. This 
was reflected in the increased utilitarian post hoc reasoning to these kinds of dilemmas among 
MHI students relative to non-injured controls, thereby highlighting congruence between "moral 
choice" and "moral reasoning." Taken together, it appears that a combination of emotional and 
cognitive mechanism is necessary for moral decision-making (e.g., Greene & Haidt, 2002; Haidt, 
2001). 
In line with the above, students with a history of MHI, unlike non-injured students, overall 
did not differentiate among the intentional violations and accidental violations. This is partially 
consistent with prior evidence indicating that individuals with severe injuries to the VMPFC 
judged attempted harms as more permissible than non-injured controls (Young et aI., 2010), 
thereby demonstrating a failure to perceive the negative intent of an agents' action. These 
findings are again consistent with the possibility that students with self-report history ofMHI 
may experience less effectively the aversive emotions associated with perceiving that an 
individual intends to harm another or not. Thus, it appears that students with a history of self-
report MHI may have some difficulties in assigning blame or forgiveness (e.g., being more 
willing to report that they would commit accidental violations than intentional ones on the basis 
of the agents intention). 
An alternative argument is that MHI students' insensitivity to the intentionality of the 
violations could be related to difficulties with theory of mind (TOM) or false belief 
understanding. In other words, a history of MHI, with assumed injuries to OFCNMPFC, may 
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have engendered deficits in attributing intention across the different types of violations. This 
seems likely as previous studies have shown deficits in TOM abilities for adolescents with TBI 
(Tonks et aI. , 2008). In the current study, we did not measure these abilities but future studies 
should consider these tasks in order to elucidate the contributions of TOM to moral decision-
making. 
Findings from the multiple regression analysis predicting direct physical harm violations 
and injury severity analysis did not offer any unique insights into the moral behavior of students 
with a history ofMHI. However, the multiple regression analysis predicting unintentional non-
~ ( 
physical harm transgressions indicates that physiological activity was the most important 
information needed to make these kinds of decisions. This is understandable due to the less 
challenging nature of these scenarios. Simply relying on one's gut feelings, which can be tied to 
the negative experience of breaking societal laws, is sufficient to make these kinds of decisions. 
Conversely, if these dilemmas were challenging morally ambiguous dilemmas, like direct 
physical harm, then certain cognitive operations (e.g., shifting attention between competing 
behavioural alternatives) might have been significant to support decision-making. Support for 
the mediating effects of physiological arousal might have been found by measuring other socio-
emotional processing skills that are important t~'moral behaviour including recognition of 
emotional states (e.g., empathy, guilt, and embarrassment) and theory of mind abilities. 
The findings that MHI participants did not show any deficits on tasks assessing cognitive 
flexibility, attention and working memory is not consistent with our hypothesis nor with findings 
from those of Baker and Good (2009). Indeed, students with a history of self-reported MHI were 
faster and more accurate on the 'days', and 'number' tasks than non-injured controls; This could 
suggest that not only did MHI students demonstrate intact executive functioning abilities, but 
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also these abilities were superior to those of non-injured students despite both groups being 
comparable in terms of level of education and age. The reason for this is unclear; it is possible 
that MHI students could have come from socially-advantaged backgrounds compared to non-
injured students which could have impacted cognitive abilities. In general, the MHI and non-
injured students are both cognitive1y capable as evidenced by their having completed high school 
and are currently emolled in university. The injury severity of these students is minor at best, 
mild at worst, and this is potentially validated by the lack of executive functioning differences 
across many measures (e.g., Muscara, Catroppa, & Anderson, 2008). 
J 
Conclusions and Implications 
These results are notable considering that these students are high functioning, academically 
successful individuals who are participating several years after having sustained a reported 
injury. Consequently, they challenge the idea that MHI is a transient condition without any 
persistent effects by providing subtle evidence oflong-term physiological and decision-making 
differences that may have potential emotional, cognitive and social ramifications. 
The implication of these findings extends beyond moraljudgment and clarifies how 
students with a history of MHI make moral decisions. Restructuring the moral scenarios to 
"' 
emphasize the 'responsibility' or 'intent' of moral transgression act and their consequent 'level 
of personal harm outcome' were fairly effective variables in altering the types of decisions 
people make. 
Notwithstanding, there are several limitations ofthis study that deserve mention. First, due 
to the small sample size, our analysis did not examine any possible influences of the moderator 
variable of time since injury. Analyses could be conducted to determine if decision making, 
cognitive performance were related to time since injury. 
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Secondly, our analysis did not examine, measure, or otherwise rule out the possible 
influence of premorbid behavioural characteristics on performance. Individuals who have 
sustained injuries (e.g., sports, falls) may be more likely to engage in riskier, sensation-seeking 
activities preinjury, thereby, more likely to sustain an MHI at all, and our results on decision-
making may be simply a reflection of this riskier, less physiologically aroused, and less 
'emotionally-guided', population as opposed to implicating anything about trauma-based neural 
disruption per se. Similarly, decision-making performance could be linked to individual 
differences in personality. For instance, individuals with higher levels of psychological well-
(' 
being have been found to take a longer time to evaluate negative versus neutral information. 
Moreover, higher psychological well-being was associated with greater activation in the ventral 
anterior cingulate cortex for negative relative to neutral information (van Reekum et aI., 2007). 
Thus, the collection of pre-injury measures of participants , performance, socio-economic status 
and/or confirmatory injury indicators, individual differences in personality are recommended. 
Finally, the characteristics of our participants and the sample size are also short-comings of 
the study. We chose a small group of high functioning individuals using a very liberal definition 
to investigate the effects of MHI. Although, our participants demonstrated the same 
.. 
neurobiological profile observed in individuals with moderate to' severe injuries, we cannot say 
for certain that these findings are generalizable to the wide spectrum (from uncomplicated to 
complicated MHI) of MHI injuries. Therefore, ongoing replication studies using larger samples 
including a wider range of injury severity are needed to confirm the existence of these deficits 
and possible consequences of having these difficulties. 
Nonetheless, by targeting a well-functioning, asymptomatic university sample with prior 
history ofMHI with arguably no persistent complaints ofPCS, our fmdings indicate that even 
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mild trauma can engender subtle long-term differences in moral decision-making and 
physiological responsiveness. Students with a reported previous mild traumatic injury were 
physiologically less responsive on measures of sympathetic nervous system arousal and were 
more likely to make decisions that reflect a lessened emotional effect towards the intentionality 
of moral transgressions relative to their cohorts. 
.( 
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Application for Access to the Psychology Research Pool 
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All studies posted to the Psychology Research Pool website must have Research Ethics Board (REB) approvaL 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
Please complete the information below about your study and then email thisformto(lindap@brocku.ca) with 
the subject line RESEARCH POOL. Using the information you have provided I will create an account for 
you on the Psychology Research Pool website. The system will automatically email you your login and 
password information. You will then be able to login to the system and input all the information about your 
study. The only information I will be inputting will be the researcher name, contact information, title of 
study and REB number. You will be responsible for setting up the rest of the study including appointment 
times, rooms, etc. 
********************************************************************************************* 
************* 
NAME OF RESEARCHER WHO WILL CONDUCT MOST OF THE JESTING: 
Julia Williams 
Jordan Atkinson 
Tanvi Sharan 
RESEARCHER CONTACT INFORMATION: TELEPHONE NUMBER: (905) 688-5550 
OFFICE NUMBER: PL 621 ext. 3556, 5523 
EMAIL: jw08tu@brocku.ca 
ja06wa@brocku.ca 
FACULTY ADVISOR (ifapplicable): Dr. Dawn Good 
Dawn.Good@brocku.ca 
(905) 688-5550 ext. 3869 
TITLE OF STUDY: Decision Making and Individual Differences 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: This study is investigating factors that influence decision making and how those 
factors are mitigated by individual differences. Participants will be asked to complete various questionnaires 
regarding personality factors and health, and measures of physiological arousal will be recorded during one 
session for approximately 1.5 hours. • -. 
IS THIS A TWO PART STUDY? no 
LENGTH OF STUDY: 1.5 hours 
SELECTION CRITERIA: Fluent in English 
ETHICS APPROVAL NUMBER (REB #): 09-120 
DEADLINES: Sign-up: 24 hour (s) before appointment 
CANCELLATION: 24 hour (s) before appointment (deadlines that occur on a 
Saturday or Sunday will be moved back to Friday) 
I 
I 
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Appendix A2: Clearance Letter from Research Ethics Board (REB) 
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DATE: 12117/2009 
FROM: Michelle McGinn, Chair 
Research Ethics Board (REB) 
TO: Dr. Dawn Good, Psychology 
Julia Williams, Jordan Atkinson, Tanvi Sharon 
FILE: 09-102 GOOD 
Masters Thesis/Project 
TITLE: Decision Making and Individual Differences 
The Brock University Research Ethics Board has reviewed the above research proposal. 
DECISION: Accepted as clarified 
This project has received ethics clearance for the period of December 17, 2009 to August 31, 2010 subject to full 
REB ratification at the Research Ethics Board's next scheduled meeting. The clearance period may be extended 
upon request. The study may now proceed. 
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Please note that the Research Ethics Board (REB) requires that you adhere to the protocol as last reviewed and 
cleared by the REB. During the course of research no deviations from, or changes to, the protocol, recruitment, or 
consent form may be initiated without prior written clearance from the REB. -The Board must provide clearance for 
any modifications before they can be implemented. If you wish to modify your research project, please refer to 
http://www.brocku.calresearchlpolicies-and-forms/forms to complete the appropriate form Revision or Modification 
to an Ongoing Application. 
Adverse or unexpected events must be reported to the REB as soon as possible with an indication of how these 
events affect, in the view of the Principal Investigator, the safety of the participants and the continuation of the 
protocol. 
If research participants are in the care of a health facility, at a school, or other institution or community organization, 
it is the responsibility of the Principal Investigator to ensure that the ethical guidelines and clearance of those 
facilities or institutions are obtained and filed with the REB prior to the initiation of any research protocols. 
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The Tri-Council Policy Statement requires that ongoing research be monitored. A Final Report is required for all 
projects upon completion of the project. Researchers with projects lasting more than one year are required to submit 
a Continuing Review Report annually. The Office of Research Services will contact you when this form Continuing 
Review/Final Report is required. 
Please quote your REB file number on all future correspondence. 
MMlmb 
Research Ethics Office 
Brock University I Brock Research 
Niagara Region I 500 Glenridge Ave. I St. Catharines, ON L2S 3Al 
brocku.ca I T 905 688 5550 x3035 I F 905 688 0748 
Please consider the environment before printing this email. 
Confidentiality Notice: This e-mail, including any attachments, may contain confidential or privileged information. 
If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender bye-mail and immediately delete this message and its 
contents. Thank you. 
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( 
Appendix A3: Brock Neuropsychology Cognitive Research Laboratory Demographic 
. Questionnaire 
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Q4-EDL 
Please fill in or circle an answer for each of the following. If you have any questions 
regarding clarification please ask the researcher. Thank you for your time and effort! 
1. How old are you? __ 
2. Gender? M F 
3. What is the highest level of education you have presently completed? 
a Less than high school 
b. High School/Grade 12 
c. University 1 2 3 4 4+ (Years) 
d. College 1 2 3 4 4+ ,t 
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4. What is your major (e.g. English, Psychology, Science)? ____________ _ 
5. Handedness 
a. Right 
b. Left 
c. Both 
6. Have you ever been hospitalized for (circle any that apply): 
a. Fractures Y N 
b. Illness Y N 
c. Surgery Y N 
d. Neurological complications Y N 
e. Other Y N 
If you answered Y to any of the above, briefly please provide details: 
e.g. How old were you? How did it happen? 
, ., 
7. Have you ever been diagnosed with a neurological condition? Y N 
8. Have you ever been diagnosed with a psychiatric condition? Y N 
9. Are you currently taking any prescribed medications for a neurological or psychiatric 
condition? Y N 
a. If Yes, if you wish to disclose what medication please do so: 
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10. Have you ever sustained an injury to your head with a force sufficient to alter your 
consciousness (e.g. dizziness, vomiting, seeing stars, or loss of consciousness, or 
confusion)? Y N 
[If you answered no to this question you may move ahead to question 22] 
If yes to question 10, please answer the following questions (if you have had more than one 
injury, please refer to the most recent time you injured your head): 
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11. If you answered yes to question 10, did you experience these symptoms for more than 20 
minutes? Y N 
12. Did you experience a loss of consciousness associated with the head injury? Y N 
1. If so, how long was the loss of consciousness? 
1. [] < 5 minutes / 
ii. [] < 30 minutes 
iii. [] < 24 hours 
IV. [] < 1 week 
v. [] < 1 month 
VI. [] > 1 month 
13. How did you injure your head? 
1. [ ] Motor vehicle collision 
11. [ ] Sports-related injury 
iii. [ ] Falling 
IV. [ ] Other Please Specify: 
14. Please briefly describe the incident during which the head injury occurred: 
15. Please answer the following questions: 
a. Did the head injury result in a concussion? Y N 
b. Did it require stitches? Y N 
c. Did you receive medical treatment for your injury? Y N 
d. Did you stay overnight at a medical care facility? Y N 
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e. Have you ever been diagnosed or classified as having a Learning Disability? 
Y N 
f. Approximately how old were you at the time _ 
g. How many months or year(s) have past since you hit your head? _ 
16. Have you sustained more than one injury to your head with a force sufficient to alter your 
consciousness (e.g. dizziness, vomiting, seeing stars, or loss of consciousness, or 
confusion)? Y N 
a. If yes, how many times? _ 
17. If you answered yes to question 16, did you experience these symptoms for more than 
20 minutes? Y N 
J 
If you responded yes to question 16, please answer the folloWing with respect to your least 
recent head injury: 
18. Did you experience a loss of consciousness associated with the least recent head injury? 
Y N 
1. If so, how long was the loss of consciousness? 
1. [] < 5 minutes 
11. [] < 30 minutes 
111. [] < 24 hours 
IV. [] < 1 week 
V. [] < 1 month 
VI. [] > 1 month 
19. How did you injure your head? 
1. [ ] Motor vehicle collision 
11. [ ] Sports-related injury ., 
111. [ ] Falling 
IV. [ ] Other Please Specify: 
20. Please briefly describe the incident during which the least recent head injury occurred: 
21. Please answer the following questions: 
a. Did the head injury result in a concussion? Y N 
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b. Did it require stitches? Y N 
c. Did you receive medical treatment for your injury? Y N 
d. Did you stay overnight at a medical care facility? Y N 
e. Approximately how old were you at the time _ 
f. How many months or year(s) have past since you hit your head?_ 
22. Have you ever experienced any other neural trauma (e.g. stroke, anoxia)? Y N 
a. If yes, please explain: 
23. Do you smoke cigarettes? Y N 
If yes, approximately how many a day? 
24. Do you regularly engage in consuming alcohol? Y N 
a. If yes, how many drinks per week do you consume? ----
b. On average how many drinks would you consume in one outing? 
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25. Do you engage in recreational drug use (e.g. smoke marijuana, drop ecstasy, etc.)? Y N 
26. Did you consume caffeine today (e.g. coffee, tea, energy drink, chocolate)? Y N 
a. If yes, how much? 
1 2 3 more than 3 
b. If yes, how much time has past since you last consumed caffeine today? 
Less than 1 hour More than 1 hour 
27. Do you have sensitivity to perfumes or scents? 
If yes, please rate your sensitivity: 
Not at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
28. Do you have a valid driver's license? Y N 
Y N 
Very 
7 8 9 
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a.lfyes, how long have you had a driver's license? 1-3 years 4-6 years 7+ years 
29. Do you wear glasses or contacts? y N 
30. Do you live: on your own with roommates 
with parents/guardians with partner 
31. How many university credits are you taking this semester? 
0.5 I 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 
32. On a scale of 1 to 9 rate your enjoyment of academics: 
Not at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ,~ 8 
"' 
other 
5 
Very 
9 
5.5 6 
33. Have you ever received any extra assistance during your educational history? Y N 
Please circle any that apply and indicate when you received the assistance: 
E = Elementary school H = High school U = University 
a. Learning resource teacher E H U 
b. Tutor E H U 
c. Educational assistant E H U 
d. Speech Language Pathologist E H U 
e. Occupational Therapist E H U 
f. Physical Therapist E H U 
g. Other: Please Specify: E H U 
34. On a scale of 1 to 9 rate your enjoyment of your life situation: 
Not at all . Very 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
35. On a scale of 1 to 9 how stressful would you rate your day-to-day life: 
Not at all Very 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
36. What extracurricular sport(s) did you play in: 
a. Elementary school: 
1. please describe/name the sport(s) - indicate if it was recreational (R) or 
competitive (C) ______________ _ 
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ii. How often do you play sports (per week)? ________ _ 
b. High school: 
1. please describe/name the sport(s) - indicate if it was recreational (R) or 
competitive (C) ______________ _ 
11. How often do you play sports (per week)? ________ _ 
c. Currently play sports in University 
1. please describe/name the sport(s) - indicate ifit was recreational (R) or 
competitive (C) ______________ _ 
11. How often do you play sports (per week)? ________ _ 
37. Do you exercise regularly? Y N 
a. If yes, how many times a week do you exercise? __ _ 
Please describe: 
-----------------------
38. When you ride a bike/skate/etc. do you wear a helmet? Y N NA 
39. Do you regularly engage in relaxation techniques (e.g. deep breathing or yoga): Y N 
a. If yes, how many times a week do you engage in relaxation methods? __ _ 
Please describe: 
-----------------------
40. Was last night's sleep typical for you? Y N 
If No, what was different (better, worse) ? 
Why was it different? (stress, room temperature, noise, etc.) 
Please indicate how well you slept last night by circling a number: 
Worst Possible 1 
Sleep 
2 3 4 5 
Please indicate how you feel right now by circling a number: 
Very Sleepy 1 2 3 4 5 
6 
6 
7 Best Possible 
Sleep 
7 Very Alert 
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41. Have you had anything out of the ordinary occur in the past day or so? Y N 
If yes, please explain: 
42. Circle any of the following that apply to your experience over the past 6 months: 
Moved 
New Job 
Loss of Job 
Loss of Relationship 
New Relationship 
Reconciliation with partner 
Reconciliation with Family 
Divorce (of self or parents) 
Entered 1 st year at university 
Death of a family member 
Death of a close friend 
Financial Jiiifficuities 
Illness of someone close to you 
Personal Illness/Injury 
New Baby 
Wedding! Engagement (self) 
Vacation 
Disrupted Sleep 
43. Please indicate how your day has been so far by circling a number: 
Calm 
Pleasant 
NOT Stressful 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 2 3 ' 4 5 6 -7 8 9 10 
12345678910 
Busy 
Unpleasant 
VERY Stressful 
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Appendix A4: Post-Concussive Syndrome Checklist 
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Post-Concussion Syndrome Checklist (PCSC) 
N~. ____________________ _ DATE ______________ __ 
Please rate the frequency, intensity and duration of each of the following 
symptoms based on how they have affected you today according to the fol-
lowing scale: 
FREQUENCY 
1 = Not at all 
2 = Seldom 
3 = Often 
4 = Very often 
5 :: All the time 
Headache 
Dizziness 
Irritability 
Memory Problems 
Difficulty 
Concentrating 
Fatigue 
Visual 
DistUTbances 
Aggravated by 
Noise 
Judgment Problems 
Anxiety 
INTENSITY 
1 = Not at all 
2 = Vaguely present 
3 = Clearly present 
4 = Interfering 
5 = Crippling 
DURATION 
1= Not at all 
2 = A few seconds 
3 = A few minutes 
4 = A few hours 
.-5 = Constant 
FREQUENCY INTENSITY DURATION 
Thank you for your time and effort in the completion of this form. 
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AS. Moral Decision Making Stimuli 
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Moral Decision Making Task 
Below you will be presented with a series of dilemmas in which you must judge how likely 
it would be that you would carry out a particular course of action. Try to actively place 
yourself in the scenario (Le., act as if the scenario presented and the decisions made are a 
reality for you). Only focus on the information given in the scenario and do not create 
alternatives or use "what ifs" to alter the nature of the situation. 
Deliberate Physical Harm 
1. Preventing the Spread 
You are a doctor. One of your patients, whom you diagnosed as HIV positive, is about to be 
released from the hospital. He has told you, in the confidence of your doctor-patient 
relationship, that he intends to infect as many people as p0!:isible with HIV starting that 
evening. -. 
Because you are bound by doctor-patient confidentiality, there is no legal way to stop this 
man from carrying out his plan. It occurs to you that you could contaminate his medication 
with an untraceable poison that will kill him before he gets a chance to infect others. You 
execute your plan in contaminating his medication and the patient dies without getting a 
chance to infect others. 
2. Crying Baby 
Enemy soldiers have taken over your Village. They have orders to kill all remaining 
civilians. You and some of your townspeople have sought refuge in the cellar of a large 
house. Outside you hear the voices of soldiers who have come to search the house for 
valuables. 
Your baby begins to cry loudly. You cover his mouth to block the sound. If you remove your 
hand from his mouth his crying will summon the attention of the soldiers who will kill you, 
your child, and the others hiding out in the cellar. To save yourself and the others you must 
smother your child to death. After contemplating the dilemma, you use your free hand to 
smother the baby. Your baby dies within a few minutes of struggling and your compatriots 
are saved. 
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3. Safari 
You and a group of ecologists are studying the wildlife in a remote stretch of jungle when 
you are captured by a group of paramilitary terrorists. You are held hostage for several 
days. One of the terrorists takes a liking to you. He informs you that his leader intends to 
kill you and the rest of the hostages the following morning. 
He says that he is willing to help you escape, but that he needs some assurance that you will 
not go to the police. He devises the following plan. He will videotape you while you kill one 
of your sleeping colleagues. The tape will ensure your silen~, making it possible for you to 
escape. Mter contemplating the terrorist's proposal you advise him of your agreement. 
Later that night, while everyone is sleeping, you use a knife supplied by the terrorist to stab 
one of your colleagues while being videotaped. Your colleague dies and you are free to go 
home. 
4. Modified Lifeboat 
You are on a cruise ship when there is a fire on board, and the ship has to be abandoned. 
The lifeboats are carrying many' more people-than they were_ designed to carry. The lifeboat 
you're in is sitting dangerously low in the water-a few inches lower and it will sink. 
The seas start to get rough, and the boat begins to fill with water. If nothing is done it will 
sink before the rescue boats arrive and everyone on board will die. However, there is an 
injured person who will not survive in any case. If you throw that person overboard the 
boat will stay afloat and the remaining passengers will be saved. After weighing the 
situation, you push the injured person overboard. The injured person drowns and the lives 
of the other persons are saved because the boat had become lighter. 
: 
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Unintentional Physical Harm 
1. Environmental Policy B2 
You are a member of a government legislature. The legislature is deciding between two 
different policies concerning environmental hazards. 
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Policy A has a 90% chance of causing no deaths at all and has a 10% chance of causing 
1000 deaths. Policy B has an 88% chance of causing no dea~s and a 12% chance of causing 
10 deaths. On the day of the voting, you decide to vote for Policy A. Sure enough, the 
implementation of the policy A. some years later caused the deaths of 1000 people. 
2. Country Road 
You are a firefighter and the only driver of the local Fire Department, speeding along a 
country road in response to a 3-alarm emergency call when you see something in the way 
of the road, extending from some roadside bushes. You pull over and encounter a man 
whose legs are clearly broken. The man explains that he has had an accident while hiking 
and asks you to take him to a nearby hospital. 
Your initial inclination is to help this man, who will probably lose his legs if he does not get 
to the hospital soon. However, if you give this man a lift, you will seriously delay the fire 
department's response to the bush fire. After weighing the situation, you decide to leave 
the man by the side of the road thereby causing the loss of the man's legs. However, you 
were able to respond effectively to the fire. 
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3. Standard Trolley 
You are at the wheel of a runaway trolley quickly approaching a fork in the tracks. On the 
tracks extending to the left is a group of five railway workmen. On the tracks extending to 
the right is a single railway workman. 
If you do nothing the trolley will proceed to the left, which will cause the deaths of the five 
workmen. The only way to avoid the deaths of these work~en is to hit a switch on your 
dashboard that will cause the trolley to proceed to the right: causing the death of the single 
workman. After contemplating the situation, you decide to hit the switch. Sure enough, 
the trolley proceeds to the right and kills the workman thereby saving the lives of the five 
railway workmen. 
4. Eyes 
In the future, you are a veteran of a war during which both of your eyes were destroyed. 
Due to recent medical advances,. it is now possible to perfor~ eye transplants, but, much to 
your anger and amazement, there are no willing donors. 
A sympathetic black-market surgeon offers to help you. If you hire him, he and his 
associates will kidnap a randomly selected stranger, carve out one of his eyes, and transfer 
it to you. You really want to see again and as a result you decide to hire the black-market 
surgeon to help you. 
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Deliberate Non-Physical Harm 
1. Donation 
You are at home one day when the mail arrives. You receive a letter from a reputable 
international aid organization. The letter asks you to make a donation of two hundred dollars to 
their organization. The letter explains that a two hundred-dollar donation will allow this 
organization to provide needed medical attention to some poor people in another part of the 
world. After considering the amount of money that you can save for that week, you decided 
against making a donation to this organization. 
2. Lost Wallet 
You are walking down the street when you come across a wallet lying on the ground. You open 
the wallet and find that it contains several hundred dollars in cash as well the owner's driver's 
license. 
From the credit cards and other items in the wallet it's very clear that the wallet's owner is 
wealthy. You, on the other hand, have been hit by hard times recently and could really use some 
extra money. After contemplating this situation, you decide to send the wallet back to the owner 
without the cash thereby keeping the cash for yourself. 
3. Speedboat 
While on vacation on a remote island, you are fishing from a seaside dock. You observe a group 
of tourists board a small boat and set sail for a nearby island. Soon after their departure you hear 
over the radio that there is a violent storm brewing, a storm that is sure to intercept them. 
The only way that you can ensure their safety is to warn them by borrowing a nearby speedboat. 
The speedboat belongs to a miserly tycoon who would not take kindly to your borrowing his 
property. However, you decide to borrow the speedboat in order to warn the tourists about the 
storm. 
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4. Sculpture 
You are visiting the sculpture garden of a wealthy art collector. The garden overlooks a valley 
containing a set of train tracks. A railway workman is working on the tracks, and an empty 
runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward the workman. 
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The only way to save the workman's life is to push one of the art collector's prized sculptures 
down into the valley so that it will roll onto the tracks and block the trolley's passage. Doing this 
will destroy the sculpture. After contemplating the situation, Y<?-U decide to push one of the art 
collector's prize sculptures, thereby causing it to block the trolfey's passage. 
Unintentional Non-Physical Harm 
1. Stock Tip 
You are a management consultant working on a case for a large corporate client. You have 
access to confidential information that would be very useful to investors. You have a friend 
who plays the stock market. You, owe this frieJ;ld a sizable sum of money. 
By providing her with certain confidential information you could help her make a lot of 
money, considerably more than you owe her. If you did this, she would insist on canceling 
your debt. Releasing information in this way is strictly forbidden by federal law. While 
browsing over the information in your office your friend walked in and glanced at the files. 
As a result, your friend recognizes that she could gain an advantage in investing in this 
corporate client. 
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2. Illegal Lunch 
You are a lawyer working on a big case. The judge presiding over the trial happens to be 
someone you knew from law school. The two of you were rather friendly back then, but 
now, decades later, it seems that your old friend barely remembers you. 
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You're quite sure that if you were to talk to him over lunch, you could jog his memory and 
he would begin to see you as an old buddy, which would be very good for your work on this 
case. It's illegal for judges and lawyers working on the same case to meet socially. 
However, while having lunch at a restaurant, the judge walked in and the restaurant owner 
introduced him to you. While talking, you were reacquainted as old buddies and this 
resulted in putting your case at an advantage. 
3. Taxes 
You are the owner of a small business trying to make ends meet It occurs to you that you 
could lower your taxes by pretending that some of your personal expenses are business 
expenses. 
For example, you could pretend that the stereo in your bedroom is being used in the lounge 
at the office, or that your dinners out with your wife are dinners with clients. While your 
accountant was completing the tax forms, you-were experien<;ing a stressful day at work. 
This affected your memory and caused you to mistake certain personal items for business 
expenses. As a result, your taxes were lowered. 
4. Resume 
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You have been trying to find a job lately without much success. You figure that you would 
be more likely to get hired if you had a more impressive resume. 
Your sister is very sympathetic to your situation. One evening while taking a nap, she 
decides to put some false information on your resume in order to make it more impressive. 
As a result of this, you managed to get hired, beating out several candidates who were more 
qualified than yourself. 
Unintentional Non-moral ,,-
.. 
1. Plant Transport 
You are bringing home a number of plants from a store that is about two miles from your 
home. The trunk of your car, which you've lined with plastic to catch the mud from the 
plants, will hold most of the plants you've purchased. 
You could bring all the plants home in one trip, but this would require putting some of the 
plants in the back seat as well as in the trunk. By putting some of the plants in the back seat 
you will ruin your fine leather upholstery which would cost thousands of dollars to replace. 
While putting some of the flowers in the trunk you receive a call from your wife calls who 
informs you about an accident involving your daughter. You drive home in a hurry in a bid 
to check on your daughter. You subsequently realize that you left some of the flowers at the 
store. As a result, you had to make another trip to the store for the flowers thereby 
preserving the fine leather upholstery of your car seat. . 
2. Train or Bus 
You need to travel from New York to Boston in order to attend a meeting that starts at 2:00 
PM. You can take either the train or the bus. 
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The train will get you there just in time for your meeting no matter what. The bus is 
scheduled to arrive an hour before your meeting, but the bus is occasionally several hours 
late because of traffic. It would be nice to have an extra hour before the meeting, but you 
cannot afford to be late. While waiting at the station, a lady standing next to you faints and 
you also notice that she has stopped breathing. You spend the next thirty minutes 
administering CPR and due to the passage of time you had no choice but to take the train 
instead of the bus. As a result you were not late for your meeting. 
3. Generic Brand 
You have a headache. You go to the pharmacy with the intention of buying a particular 
name-brand headache medicine. When you get there you discover that the pharmacy is out 
of the brand you were looking for. 
The pharmacist, whom you've known for a long time and in whom you have a great deal of 
trust, tells you that he has in stock a generic product which is, in his words, "exactly the 
same" as the product you had originally intended to buy. While listening to the pharmacist, 
you suddenly remember an urgent meeting with your boss which is schedule to start 
within the next ten minutes. As a result, you abort the search for the name-brand 
medication and purchase the generic brand instead. 
4. New Job 
You have been offered employment by two different firms, and you are trying to decide 
which offer to accept. 
Firm A has offered you an annual salary of $100,000 and fourteen days of vacation per 
year. Firm B has offered you an annual salary of $50,000 and sixteen days of vacation per 
year. The two firms and the two positions are otherwise very similar. On day you are 
schedule to sign the contract with Firm A you are inform by the adoption agency that your 
application to adopt an orphan has been approved. As a result, you had to take Firm B's 
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offer which allows you to have more vacation days to spend with your new child. 
Deliberate Non-Moral 
1. Brownies 
You have decided to make a batch of brownies for yourself. You open your recipe book and fmd 
a recipe for brownies. 
The recipe calls for a cup of chopped walnuts. You don't like w;alnuts, but you do like 
macadamia nuts. As it happens, you have both kinds of nuts available to you. In order to avoid 
eating walnuts you decide to substitute macadamia nuts for walnuts in the recipe. 
2. Computer 
You are looking to buy a new computer. At the moment the computer that you want costs $1000. 
A friend who knows the computer industry has told you that this computer's price will drop to 
$500 next month. 
If you wait until next month to buy your new computer you will have to use your old computer 
for a few weeks longer than you would like to. Nevertheless you-will be able to do everything 
you need to do using your old computer during that time. In order to save $500 on the purchase 
of a new computer you decide to use your old computer for a few more weeks. 
3. Survey 
A representative of a reputable, national survey organization calls you at your home while you 
are having a quiet dinner by yourself. 
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The representative explains that if you are willing to spend a half an hour answering questions 
about a variety of topics her organization will send you a check for $200. In order to earn $200 
you decide interrupt your dinner to participate in the survey. 
4. FoodPrep 
You are preparing pasta with fresh vegetables, and you are deciding on the order in which you 
will do the various things you need to do. You are in a big hurry. 
At the moment you have a slight urge to cut vegetables. If you f,kst start the water boiling and 
then cut the vegetables you will be done in twenty minutes. Ifyhu cut the vegetables and then 
start the water boiling you will be done in forty minutes. In order to satisfy your slight urge to 
cut the vegetables you decide to cut the vegetable first and then start the water boiling. 
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Appendix B: Tables for descriptive statistics and statistical analyses 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics of Demographic Characteristics for Order of Dilemmas 
Gender 
Female 
Male 
Education 
Less than high sch. 
High sch. graduate 
College graduate 
Some university 
Age (years) 
M(SD) 
Order 1 
(n = 14) 
n % 
10 34.5 
4 21.1 
0 0.0 
3 25.0 
2 66.7 
9 29.0 
20.64 2.92 
Order 2 
(n = 12) 
n % 
9 31.0 
3 15.8 
0 0.0 
3 25.0 
1 33.3 
8 25.8 
20.67 2.70 
Order 3 
( n=lO) 
n % 
6 20.7 
( 
-, 
4 21.1 
1 100.0 
3 25.0 
0 0.0 
6 19.4 
21.30 4.29 
Order 4 
(n = 12) 
n % 
4 13.8 
8 42.1 
0 0.0 
3 25.0 
0 0.0 
8 25.8 
20.0 2.13 
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5.45 (3); .141 
6.80 (9); .658 
0.33 (3,44); .80 
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Table 4 
Summary Statistics for Demographic Characteristics for Participants with MIff and No MIff 
Drug use 
Yes 
No 
Sensitivity to perfume 
Yes 
No 
Other neural trauma 
Yes 
No 
Educational assistance 
Yes 
No 
Occupational therapist 
High school 
Learning resource teacher 
Elementary 
Table 4 Continued 
MHI 
(n = 24) 
n % 
5 20.83 
19 79.16 
3 12.50 
21 87.50 
1 4.54 
21 95.45 
11 47.8 
12 52.2 
- 0 
1 100.0 
3 60.0 
NoMHI 
(n = 24) 
n % 
7 30.43 
16 / 69.56 
8 33.3 
16 66.7 
0 .0 
21 100.0 
10 41.7 
14 58.3 
0 0.0 
2 40.0 
i (dj);p 
0.56 (1); .450 
3.27 (2); .194 
0.97 (1); .323 
0.18 (1); .671 
no statistics 
no statistics 
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Summary Statistics for Demographic Characteristics for Participants with MIff and No MIff 
Tutor 0.78 (2); .675 
Elementary 3 30.0 1 12.5 
High school 5 50.0 5 62.5 
University 2 20.0 2 25.0 
Physical therapist no statistics 
Highschool 1 50.0 0 0.0 
University 1 50.0 0 0.0 
Educational assistant no statistics 
University 1 100.0 0 , ~ 0.0 
Living 1.68 (4); .793 
Own 2 8.3 2 8.3 
Roommates 14 58.3 12 50.0 
Parents 5 20.8 7 29.2 
Partner 3 12.5 2 8.3 
Other 0 0.0 1 4.2 
Wear glasses 2.08 (1); .149 
Yes 10 41.7 15 62.5 
No 14 58.3 9 37.5 
Table 5 
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Summary Statistics for Arousal Indicators for Participants with MIfI and No MIfI 
Variable 
Current mood 
Current activity level 
Current stress 
Sleep quality 
Current credits undertaken 
MHI 
(n = 24) 
M SD 
4.62 1.37 
4.88 2.86 
3.96 2.36 
4.54 1.28 
3.75 1.36 
NoMHI 
(n = 24) 
M SD 
5.17 1.09 
7.17 10.34 
/ 
-. 
4.33 2.39 
4.96 1.29 
3.85 1.31 
F (dj);p 
2.28 (1, 46); .13 
1.09 (1, 46); .30 
0.29 (1,46); .58 
1.21 (1, 46); .27 
0.07 (1, 46); .78 
147 
Running head: AROUSAL AND MORAL DECISION MAKING 
Table 6 
Summary Statistics for Perceived Enjoyment of Life and Academic Situation for Participants 
with MHI and No MHI 
Variable 
Enjoyment of life 
Number of credits taken 
Enjoyment of academics 
MHI 
(n = 24) 
M SD 
7.08 1.47 
3.75 1.36 
6.17 1.90 
NoMHI 
(n = 24) 
M SD 
6.78 1.62 
3.85 1.~1 
5.62 1.86 
F (dj);p 
0.44 (1, 46); .50 
0.07 (1, 46); .78 
0.99 (1, 46); .32 
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Table 7 
Summary Statistics for Order of Dilemmas by Time of Day Tested for MIff participants 
Order 1 Order 2 Order 3 Order 4 
Variable n % n % n % n % 
Time of day tested 
Morning o 0.0 2 8.3 3 12.5 1 4.2 
'. 
Afternoon 7 38.9 4 16.7 2 8.3 5 20.8 
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Table 8 
Summary Statistics for Order of Dilemmas by Time of Day Tested for No MHI participants 
Order 1 Order 2 Order 3 Order 4 
Variable n % n % n % n % 
Time of day tested 
Morning 0 0.0 1 4.2 2 8.3 1 4.2 
~ ( 
-. 
Afternoon 7 29.2 4 21.2 3 12.5 5 20.8 
Evening 0 0.0 1 4.2 0 0.0 0 0.0 
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Table 9 
Descriptive Statistics for Baseline Arousal (HR Activity) by Time of Day Tested 
Variable 
Time of day 
Morning 
Afternoon 
Evening 
M 
75.25 
74.35 
92.51 
SD 
9.69 
18.25 
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Table 25 
Analysis of Variance of Anticipatory HR Activity (Frequency) by MHI Groups and Type of 
Dilemma 
Source df MS F p n 
Within subjects 
Dilemma 5 12.28 1.29 .27 .02 
Dilemma x MHI 5 10.18 1.07 .37 .34 
J 
Error 225 
Between subjects 
152 
MHI 1 1335.98 3.58 .065 .074 
Error 45 
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Table 26 
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Analysis of Variance of HR Activity (Frequency) During the Onset of Dilemma. by MHI Groups 
and Type of Dilemma 
Source df MS F p 11 
Within subjects 
Dilemma 5 12.28 1.29 0.26 .02 
Dilemma x MHI 5 10.18 0.61 0.60 .01 
J 
Error 225 
Between subj ects 
MHI 1 1335.98 3.58 0.06 .07 
Error 45 
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Table 27 
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Analysis of Variance of HR Activity (Frequency) During the Responses to Dilemmas by MHI 
Groups and Type of Dilemma 
Source df MS F P 
Within subjects 
Dilemma 5 90.83 1.52 .18 .033 
Dilemma x MHI 5 139.2 2.33 .322 .026 
, f 
"-
Error 225 
Between subjects 
MHI 1 914.11 2.59 .114 .055 
Error 45 
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Table 28 
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Analysis of Variance of HR Activity (Frequency) During the Response Reaction to Dilemmas by 
MHI Groups and Type of Dilemma 
Source df MS F p 11 
Within subjects 
Dilemma 5 65.19 2.55 .029 .054 
Dilemma x MHI 5 30.08 1.17 .321 .026 
J 
Error 225 
Between subjects 
MHI 1 914.11 2.58 .114 .055 
Error 45 
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Table 29 
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Analysis of Variance of Self-report of Arousal State by MHI Groups and Type of Dilemma 
Source df MS F P n 
Within subjects 
Dilemma 5 14.55 16.59 .000 .278 
Dilemma x MHI 5 1.08 1.23 .293 .028 
(' 
Error 215 
Between subjects 
MHI 1 13.56 0.36 .360 .020 
Error 43 
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Table 30 
Analysis o/Variance o/Dilemma Ratings by MHI Groups and Type o/Dilemma 
Source 
Intention 
Intention x MHI 
Error 
Moral 
MoralxMHI 
Error 
Intention x Moral 
Intention x Moral x MHI 
Error 
MHI 
Error 
d/ 
1 
1 
46 
2 
2 
92 
2 
2 
92 
1 
46 
MS F P 
Within subjects 
0.13 0.44 .506 
0.12 0.40 .528 
/ 
17.86 38.58 .000 
0.92 1.99 .141 
0.44 1.88 .158 
1.16 4.96 .009 
BetweeJ:!.. subjects 
1.10 0.89 .348 
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n 
.010 
.009 
.456 
.042 
.039 
.097 
.019 
Running head: AROUSAL AND MORAL DECISION MAKING 
Table 31 
Analysis of Variance of Dilemma Ratings by No MIff Group and Type of Dilemma 
Source df MS F P 
Within subjects 
Moral 2 12.38 27.39 .000 
Error 46 
, ~ 
Intention 1 0.00 0.00 .979 
Error 23 
Moral x Intention 2 1.47 8.02 .001 
Error 46 
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n 
.544 
.000 
.259 
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Table 32 
Analysis of Variance of Dilemma Ratings by MHI Group and Type of Dilemma 
Source df MS F p 
Within subjects 
Moral 2 6.41 13.52 .000 
Error 46 
J 
Intention 1 0.26 0.70 .411 
Error 23 
Moral x Intention 2 0.13 0.46 .633 
Error 46 
159 
n 
.370 
.030 
.020 
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Table 33 
Analysis a/Variance a/Unintentional Dilemma Ratings by No MIff Group 
Source d/ MS F p 
Within subjects 
Unintentional 2 4.14 14.09 .000 
Error 46 
Table 34 
Analysis a/Variance a/Deliberate Dilemma Ratings by No MIff Group 
Source d/ MS F p 
"' Within subjects 
Deliberate 2 13.06 28.38 .000 
Error 46 
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n 
.380 
n 
.552 
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Table 36 
161 
Analysis of Variance of Reaction Time to Dilemmas by MHI Groups and Type of Dilemma 
Source 
Moral 
Moral x MHI 
Error 
Intentionality 
Intentionality x MHI 
Error 
Intention x Moral 
Intention x Moral x MHI 
Error 
MHI 
Error 
df 
2 
2 
92 
1 
1 
46 
2 
2 
92 
1 
46 
MS F 
Within subjects 
2.60 
2.32 
23.31 
3.59 
5.97 
2.02 
Between subjects 
1.19 
3.34 
2.97 
/ 
33.30 
5.13 
12.54 
4.24 
0.28 
P n 
.040 .068 
.056 .061 
.000 .420 
.028 .100 
.000 .214 
.017 .084 
.598 .006 
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Table 37 
Analysis a/Variance a/Reaction Time to Moral Dilemma by No MIff Group and Type 0/ 
Dilemma 
Source d/ MS F p 
Within subjects 
Moral 2 4.81 5.61 .007 
Error 46 
( 
Intention 1 22.61 37.90 .000 
Error 23 
Moral x Intention 2 3.43 7.67 .001 
Error 46 
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n 
.196 
.622 
.250 
.' 
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Table 38 
Analysis of Variance of Reaction Time to Dilemmas by MHI Group and Type of Dilemma 
Source df MS F P 
Within subjects 
Moral 2 0.12 0.17 .838 
Error 46 
( 
Intention 1 4.29 5.34 .030 
Error 23 
Moral x Intention 2 4.55 9.03 .000 
Error 46 
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n 
.008 
.189 
.282 
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Table 39 
Analysis of Variance of Reaction Time to Unintentional Dilemmas by No MHI Group 
Source df MS F P 
Within subjects 
Unintentional 2 8.07 8.71 .001 
Error 46 
, f' 
'. 
Table 40 
Analysis of Variance of Reaction Time to Deliberate Dilemmas by No MHI Group 
Source df MS F p 
-, 
Within subjects 
Deliberate 2 0.17 0.46 .633 
.020 
Error 46 
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n 
.275 
n 
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Table 41 
Analysis o/Variance o/Reaction Time to Unintentional Dilemmas by MIff Group 
Source d/ MS F P 
Within subjects 
Unintentional 2 3.09 4.51 .016 
Error 46 
, ~ 
--
Table 42 
Analysis o/Variance o/Reaction Time to Deliberate Dilemmas by MHf Group 
Source df MS F p 
., 
Within subjects 
Deliberate 2 1.58 3.03 .058 
Error 46 
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n 
.164 
n 
.116 
Running head: AROUSAL AND MORAL DECISION MAKING 
Table 43 
Descriptive Statistics for Social Problem Solving Inventory Measure for MHI and No MHI 
Groups 
MHI NoMHI 
Variable M SD M SD F(1,46) p 
Positive problem orientation 2.61 0.79 2.30 0.95 1.49 .22 
Negative problem orientation 1.43 0.92 1.87( 1.10 2.23 .14 
Rational problem solving 2.34 1.00 2.39 0.80 0.04 .83 
Impulsivity/carelessness style 1.33 0.65 1.33 0.81 0.00 .96 
A voidance style 1.57 0.74 1.55 0.82 0.01 .91 
Problem defmition & fonnulation 2.42 0.92 2.39 0.94 0.01 .91 
Generation of alternative solution 2.35 0.72 2.51 0.90 0.45 .50 
Decision making 2.54 0.86 2.34 0.81 0.68 .41 
Solution implementation & veri. 2.31 0.86 2.32 0.86 0.00 .98 
Total SPSI 12.29 3.72 11.45 3.88 0.58 .44 
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Table 44 
Descriptive Statistics for Mental Control Measure for MHI and No MHI Groups 
MHI NoMHI 
Variable M SD M SD F(l, 46) 
MC number response time 4.13 1.36 4.95 0.88 6.17 
MC number accuracy 3.83 0.87 3.33 0.64 5.17 
MC alphabet response time 4.63 0.92 0.9;4 21.33 0.71 
MC alphabet accuracy 3.38 0.65 2.92 1.25 2.55 
MC days response time 2.17 0.56 2.75 0.80 8.47 
MC days Accuracy 3.17 0.56 2.79 0.50 5.84 
MC months response time 4.38 1.21 4.51 1.19 0.15 
MC months accuracy 2.83 1.31 2.83 1.01 0.00 
MC number backwards resp. time 6.00 1.64 6.94 1.76 3.67 
MC number backwards accuracy 3.88 0.90 3.58 1.14 0.96 
MC days backwards resp. time 3.54 0.8.8 3.65 0.78 0.21 
MC days backwards accuracy 4.33 0.92 4.29 0.69 0.32 
MC months backwards resp. time 11.08 4.14 11.35 4.86 0.43 
MC months backwards accuracy 3.62 1.47 3.50 1.50 0.85 
MC switching response time 16.92 6.32 18.69 7.57 0.77 
MC switching accuracy 2.50 2.15 2.42 1.79 0.21 
MC total score 27.42 3.99 25.67 4.31 2.12 
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p 
.01 
.02 
.40 
.11 
.00 
.02 
.69 
1.00 
.06 
.33 
.64 
.86 
.83 
.77 
.38 
.88 
.15 
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Table 45 
Descriptive Statistics for Trails Sequencing Test Measure for MHI and No MHI Groups 
MHI NoMHI 
Variable M SD M SD F (1,46) 
TRAILS number res. Time 30.94 11.42 33.55 9.35 0.74 
TRAILS number error 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.34 3.28 
J 
TRAILS alphabet res. Time 29.00 10.25 30.4410.38 0.23 
TRAILS alphabet acc. 0.12 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.86 
TRAILS switching res time 60.58 22.21 64.2616.65 0.42 
TRAILS switching error 1.88 4.51 1.08 1.59 0.65 
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p 
.39 
.07 
.63 
.17 
.52 
.42 
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Table 46 
Descriptive Statistics for Pictorial Analogies Test (CTONf) Measure for MIff and No MIff 
Groups 
MHI NoMHI 
Variable M SD M SD df F p 
CTONI pictorial analg. accuracy 15.65 3.26 15.00 3.19 (1,43) 0.46 .50 
CTONI pictorial analg. Resp. time 226.29 72.74204.4372.37 (1,27) 0.63 .43 
(' 
169 
Running head: AROUSAL AND MORAL DECISION MAKING 
Table 47 
Descriptive Statisticsfor Stroop Color-Word Interference Measurefor MIll and No MIll 
Groups 
MHI NoMHI 
Variable M SD M SD F(1,46) p 
Stroop-Color naming resp.time 26.62 3.75 29.38 5.52 3.98 .05 
Stroop-Color naming SC error 0.29 0.55 0.33 0.57 0.06 .79 
t 
: 
Stroop-Color naming UC error 0.25 0.53 0.'00 0.00 5.30 .02 
Stroop-Word reading res. time 20.71 3.87 19.78 3.08 0.83 .36 
Stroop-Word reading SC error 0.29 0.46 0.12 0.34 2.02 .16 
Stroop-Word reading UC error 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.20 1.00 .32 
Stroop-Inhibition resp. time 47.89 9.61 51.67 12.79 1.30 .25 
Stroop-Inhibition SC error 1.42 1.35 1.38 1.25 0.12 .91 
Stroop-Inhibition UC error 0.21 0.51 0.88 1.73 3.28 .07 
Stroop-Inhibition/switching RP 54.01 8.42 57.90 12.19 1.56 .21 
Stroop-Inhibition/switching SC err. 1.39 1.44 1.62 1.31 0.33 .56 
Stroop-Inhibition/switching UC err. 1.00 1.28 1.62 3.69 0.59 .44 
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Table 48 
Descriptive Statistics for Deliberate Physical Harm Ratings, HR activity (Onset), Executive 
Functioning Measures and MHI Status 
Variable n M SD 
DP ratings 46 1.13 0.83 
IDNM HR activity 46 76.99 9.07 
DNM HR activity 46 77.02 J 8.84 
IDNP HR activity 46 77.24 8.89 
DNP HR activity 46 77.03 8.61 
IDP HR activity 46 77.82 8.00 
DP HR activity 46 77.10 7.80 
MC- Number response time 46 4.55 1.20 
MC- Number accuracy 46 3.57 0.77 
MC- Days response time 46 2.43 0.75 
MC-Days accuracy 46 2.98 0.57 
Stroop-Color naming time 46 28.20 4.80 
Stroop-Color naming UC 46 0.13 0.40 
MHI status 46 0.48 0.50 
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Table 49 
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Inter-correlations of Deliberate Physical Harm Ratings with HR Activity (Onset), Executive Functioning Measures and MIfI Status 
N=46 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
DP ratings -.25 -.30* -.33* -.29* -.23 -.20 -.13 .31* -.05 .02 .14 -.16 -.10 .25 
IDNMHR .95*** .93*** .91 ** .92** .87*** .31 *** -.30* .37** -.24** .06 .25* -.32 -.20 
DNMHR .93*** .94***.90*** .89*** .29* -.29* .35***-.17 . 04 .24 -.28*-. 19 
IDNPHR .93*** .91*** .88*** .25 -.23 .26 .20 .07 .24 -.31* .20 
DNPHR .85*** .87*** .31**-.30** .34** -.18 .04 .24* -.23 -.20 
IDPHR .91 *** .28 -.26 .34 -.26 .17 .25* -.33 -.23** 
DPHR .28* -.24* .32* -.23* .20 .30* -.28* -.22* 
MC-Number response time -.84* .24 -.20 .17 .30 .06 -.33* 
"-
MC-Number accuracy .20 .22 .03 -.19 -.17 .31 * 
MC-Days response time -.54*** .20 .15 -.04 -.44*** 
MC-Days accuracy .01 -.11 .01 .34* 
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Table 49 Continued 
Inter-correlations of Participants' Deliberate Physical Harms Ratings with HR Activity, Executive Functioning Measures and MIfI 
Status 
Trails-Number accuracy .14 -.08 -.25 
Stroop-Color naming response time -.10 -.26 
Stroop-Color naming UC 
-.31 * 
MHI status 
*p<.05 
**p < .01 
***p < .001 
... ' " 
...... 
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Table 50 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Deliberate Physical Harm Ratings from 
HR Activity (Onset), Executive Functioning Measures and MHI Status 
Predictor /3 B LiR2 FLi df p s~ 
Step 1 
IDNM HR activity 0.61 0.05 0.20 1.63 6,39 0.16 0.25 
DNM HR activity -0.75 -0.72 0.03 
IDNP HR activity -0.93 -0.08 0.06 
J 
DNP HR activity 0.23 0.02 0.00 
IDP HR activity 0.19 0.02 0.00 
DP HR activity 0.37 0.04 0.01 
Step 2 
MC-Number time 0.47 0.33 0.17 1.28 7,32 .34 0.05 
MC-Number accuracy 0.66 0.71 0.09 
MC-Days time -0.11 -0.12 0.00 
MC-Days accuracy -0.13 -0.09 0.00 
-, 
Trails Number error 0.04 0.13 0.00 
Stroop-Color naming time -0.15 -0.02 0.02 
Stroop-Color naming UC -0.11 -0.25 0.01 
Step 3 
MHI status 0.18 0.30 0.01 0.90 1,31 .28 0.01 
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Table 51 
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Descriptive Statistics for Unintentional Physical Harm Ratings, HR activity (Onset), Executive 
Functioning Measures and MHI Status 
Variable n M SD 
IDP ratings 46 1.25 0.61 
IDNM HR activity 46 76.99 9.07 
DNM HR activity 46 77.02 8.84 
( 
. . 
IDNP HR activity 46 77.24 ", 8.89 
DNP HR activity 46 77.03 8.61 
IDP HR activity 46 77.82 8.00 
DP HR activity 46 77.10 7.80 
MC- Number response time 46 4.55 1.20 
MC- Number accuracy 46 3.57 0.77 
MC- Days response time 46 2.43 0.75 
MC-Days accuracy 46 2.98 0.57 
Stroop-Color naming time 46 28.20 4.80 
Stroop-Color naming UC 46 0.13 0.40 
MHI status 46 0.48 0.50 
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Table 52 
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Inter-correlations of Unintentional Physical Harm Ratings with HR Activity (Onset), Executive Functioning Measures and MIll Status 
N=46 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
IDP ratings -.09 .04 .09 .09 .17 .27 .03 .13 .00 .06 .32* .17 -.16 .13 
IDNMHR .95*** .93*** .91 ** .92** .87*** .31 *** -.30* .37** -.24** .06 .25* -.32 -.20 
DNMHR .93*** .94***.90*** .89*** .29* -.29* .35***-.17 . 04 .24 -.28*-. 19 
IDNPHR .93*** .91 *** .88*** .25 -.23 .26 .20 .07 .24 -.31* .20 
DNPHR .85*** .87*** .31 ** -.30** .34** -.18 .04 .24* -.23 -.20 
IDPHR .91 *** .28 -.26 .34 -.26 .17 .25* -.33 -.23** 
DPHR .28* -.24* .32* -.23* .20 .30* -.28* -.22* 
MC-Number response time -.84* .24 -.20 .17 .30 .06 -.33* 
... ' . ~ 
." MC-Number accuracy .20 .22 .03 -.19 -.17 .31 * 
MC-Days response time -.54*** .20 .15 -.04 -.44*** 
MC-Days accuracy .01 -.11 .01 .34* 
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Table 52 Continued 
Inter-correlations of Participants' Unintentional Physical Harm Ratings with HR Activity (Onset), Executive Functioning Measures 
and MHI Status 
Trails-Number accuracy .14 -.08 -.25 
Stroop-Color naming response time -.10 -.26 
Stroop-Color naming UC 
-.31 * 
MHI status 
*p<.05 
**p < .01 
***p < .001 
.... 
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Table 53 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Unintentional Physical Harm Ratings 
from HR Activity (Onset), Executive Functioning Measures and MHI Status 
Predictor B AR2 FA df p sr 
Step 1 
IDNM HR activity 0.27 0.01 0.28 2.56 6,39 0.03 , 0.00 
DNM HR activity -1.24 -0.08 0.08 
IDNP HR activity -0.38 -0.02 0.01 
~ 
" 
" 
DNP HR activity 0.30 0.02 0.00 
IDP HR activity 0.13 0.01 0.00 
DP HR activity 1.09 0.08 0.14 
Step 2 
MC-Number time 0.29 0.14 0.17 1.28 7,32 .34 0.01 
MC-Number accuracy 0.38 0.30 0.03 
MC-Days time -0.02 -0.02 0.00 
MC-Days accuracy 0.16 0.17 0.01 
Trails Number error 0.07 0.17 0.00 
Stroop-Color naming time 0.05 0.00 0.00 
Stroop-Color naming UC -0.06 -0.10 0.00 
Step 3 
MHI status -0.23 -0.29 0.31 1.65 1,31 .20 0.03 
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Table 54 
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Descriptive Statistics for Deliberate Non-physical Harm Ratings, HR activity (Onset), Executive 
Functioning Measures and MHI Status 
Variable n M SD 
DNP ratings 46 1.54 0.67 
IDNM HR activity 46 76.99 9.07 
DNM HR activity 46 77.02 8.84 
/ 
IDNP HR activity 46 77.24 \ 8.89 
DNP HR activity 46 77.03 8.61 
IDP HR activity 46 77.82 8.00 
DP HR activity 46 77.10 7.80 
MC- Number response time 46 4.55 1.20 
MC- Number accuracy 46 3.57 0.77 
MC- Days response time 46 2.43 0.75 
MC-Days accuracy 46 2.98 0.57 
Stroop-Color naming time 46 28.20 4.80 
Stroop-Color naming UC 46 0.13 0.40 
MHI status 46 0.48 0.50 
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Table 55 
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Inter-correlations of Deliberate Non-physical Harm Ratings with HR Activity (Onset), Executive Functioning Measures and MHI 
Status 
N=46 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
DNP ratings -.09 -.14 -.15 -.12 -.11 -.28 - .06 .19 -.13 .03 .21 -.03 -.25 .17 
IDNMHR .95*** .93*** .91 ** .92** .87*** .31 *** -.30* .37** -.24** .06 .25* -.32 -.20 
DNMHR .93*** .94***.90*** .89*** .29* -.29* .35***-.17 .04 .24 -.28*-. 19 
IDNPHR .93*** .91 *** .88*** .25 -.23 .26 .20 .07 .24 -.31* .20 
DNPHR .85*** .87*** .31 ** -.30** .34** -.18 .04 .24* -.23 -.20 
IDPHR .91 *** .28 -.26 .34 -.26 .17 .25* -.33 -.23** 
DPHR .28* -.24* .32* -.23* .20 .30* -.28* -.22* 
MC-Number response time 
.... 
-.84* .24 -.20 .17 .30 .06 -.33* 
MC-Number accuracy .20 .22 .03 -.19 -.17 .31 * 
MC-Days response time -.54*** .20 .15 -.04 -.44*** 
MC-Days accuracy .01 -.11 .01 .34* 
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Table 55 Continued 
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Inter-correlations of Participants' Deliberate Non-physical Harm Ratings with HR Activity, Executive Functioning Measures and 
MIll Status 
Trails-Number accuracy .14 -.08 -.25 
Stroop-Color naming response time -.10 -.26 
Stroop-Color naming UC 
-.31 * 
MHI status 
*p<.05 
**p < .01 
***p < .001 
.' ..... 
182 
Running head: AROUSAL AND MORAL DECISION MAKING 
Table 56 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Deliberate Non-physical Harm Ratings 
from HR Activity (Onset), Executive Functioning Measures and MHI Status 
Predictor B M2 FIl df p s~ 
Step 1 
IDNM HR activity 0.38 0.03 0.09 0.65 6,39 0.68 0.05 
DNM HR activity -0.44 -0.03 0.03 
IDNP HR activity -0.07 -0.00 0.01 
/ 
DNP HR activity 0.30 0.02 0.00 
IDP HR activity -0.72 -0.07 0.01 
DP HR activity 0.47 0.04 0.07 
Step 2 
MC-Number time 0.11 0.07 0.26 1.91 7,32 .34 0.00 
MC-Number accuracy 0.33 0.33 0.01 
MC-Days time -0.23 -0.23 0.04 
MC-Days accuracy -0.42 -0.56 0.01 
., 
Trails Number error 0.22 0.68 0.02 
Stroop-Color naming time -0.04 -0.00 0.00 
Stroop-Color naming UC -0.32 -0.61 0.06 
Step 3 
MHI status 0.32 0.48 0.04 2.48 1,31 .12 0.00 
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Table 57 
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Descriptive Statistics for Post Concussion Syndrome Checklist Measure for MIll and No-MIll 
Groups 
MHI NoMHI 
Variable M SD M SD 
Total score 65.21 11.62 62.70 19.92 
Frequency score 20.13 4.11 19.65 7.15 
~ 
. . 
Intensity score 20.75 4.11 .. 19.83 6.35 
Duration score 24.33 4.34 23.22 6.82 
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Table 58 
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Mean and Sum of Ranks for the Frequency of Post Concussion Symptoms for MIff and No-MIff 
Groups 
MHI NoMHI 
Variable M Sum M Sum z p 
Headache 24.71 593.00 23.26 535.00 -.39 .69 
Dizziness 24.85 596.50 23.11 531.50 -.48 .62 
,t 
Irritability 25.58 614.11 22.35 514.00 -.86 .38 
Memory problems 25.21 605.00 22.74 523.00 -.70 .48 
Concentration diff. 23.92 574.00 24.09 554.00 -.04 .96 
Fatigue 25.62 615.00 22.30 513.00 -.86 .38 
Visual disturbances . 22.69 544.50 25.37 583.50 -1.02 .30 
Aggravated by noise 24.56 589.50 23.41 538.50 -.32 .74 
Judgment 25.50 612.00 22.43 516.00 -1.00 .31 
Anxiety 26.46 635.00 21.43 493.00 -1.32 .18 
Running head: AROUSAL AND MORAL DECISION MAKING 
Table 59 
Mean and Sum of Ranks for the Intensity of Post Concussion Symptoms for MHI and No-MHI 
Groups 
MHI NoMHI 
Variable M Sum M Sum z p 
Headache 24.06 577.50 23.93 550.50 -.03 .97 
Dizziness 25.67 616.00 22.26 512.00 -.96 .33 
,. 
: 
Irritability 25.90 621.50 22.d'2 506.50 -1.01 .30 
Memory problems 26.10 626.50 21.80 501.50 -1.24 .21 
Concentration diff. 23.88 573.00 24.13 555.00 -.06 .94 
Fatigue 24.98 599.00 22.98 528.50 -.52 .59 
Visual disturbances 23.25 558.00 24.78 570.00 -.61 .53 
Aggravated by noise 25.48 611.50 22.46 516.50 -.87 .38 
Judgment 24.77 594.50 23.20 533.50 -.60 .54 
Anxiety 24.75 594.00 23.22 534.00 -.40 .68 
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Table 60 
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Mean and Sum of Ranks for the Duration of Post Concussion Symptoms for MHI and No-MHI 
Groups 
MHI NoMHI 
Variable M Sum M Sum z p 
Headache 23.35 560.50 24.67 567.50 -.37 .71 
Dizziness 25.50 612.00 22.43 516.00 -.86 .38 
.t 
Irritability 25.00 600.00 22.96 528.00 -.53 .59 
Memory problems 24.69 592.50 23.28 535.00 - .40 .68 
Concentration diff. 25.12 603.00 22.83 525.00 -.60 .54 
Fatigue 24.79 595.00 23.17 533.00 -.46 .64 
Visual disturbances 23.46 563.00 24.57 565.00 -.46 .64 
Aggravated by noise 25.48 611.50 22.46 516.50 -.87 .38 
Judgment 25.27 606.50 22.67 521.50 -.94 .34 
Anxiety 24.58 590.00 23.39 538.00 -.40 .68 
~t 
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Appendix C: Checking assumptions for multiple regression predicting unintentional non-
Physical harm ratings 
( 
187 
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Normality Analysis for Unintentional Non-Physical Harm Violations 
Statistics 
MNonPhyslndirect 
N Valid 48 
Missing 
Mean 1.4410 
Median 1.5000 
Mode .503 f 
'. 
Std. Deviation .75681 
Skewness -.068 
Std. Error of Skewness .343 
Kurtosis -.964 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .674 
Minimum .00 
Maximum 2.75 
a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is 
shown 
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Histogram 
MNonPhyslndirect 
Mean=1.44 
std. Dev. =0.757 
N =48 
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Dependent Variable: MNonPhyslndirect 
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Normality Analysis of Residuals 
Statistics 
Standardized Residual 
N Valid 45 
Missing 4 
Mean .0000000 
Median .0011407 
Mode -1.939613 
(' 
Std. Deviation .82572282 
Variance .682 
Skewness -.343 
Std. Error of Skewness .354 
Kurtosis -.542 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .695 
Minimum -1.93961 
Maximum 1.40038 
a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is 
shown 
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Histogram 
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Standardized Residual 
2.00000 
Mean =-5.00E-16 
std. Dev. =0.826 
N =45 
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Graph: Checking Misspecification ofthe model 
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